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INTRODUCTION

Every few decades, there erupt political and academic debates over
the proper nature and purpose of the corporation. 1 It is black letter
law, according to most scholars, that corporations exist to maximize
shareholder wealth. Others maintain that the corporation should exist
for the benefit of multiple constituencies, regardless of what current
black letter law may say. The current discourse of corporate purpose,
however, is incomplete and misleading. The disarray has resulted from
insufficient reliance on historical context in (1) analyzing the firm
under modern theories of corporate governance, and (2) interpreting
the “purpose” language in corporate charters and corporation-law
statutes.
Modern conceptions of corporate governance, and by extension,
corporate purpose, have failed to account for the historical evolution
of the firm. Significantly, they characterize the corporation along too
few dimensions, typically treating the firm as merely, and exclusively,
a contract- or property-based entity; and they neglect to treat the laterstage corporation as a historical entity that inherits characteristics and
restrictions, including its purpose, from the time of its founding.
Corporations are a triality of property, contractual, and
associational rights. Firms can simultaneously and independently be
described along each dimension. The triality of rights should entitle
shareholders to form general corporations to pursue the ends of their
choosing—shareholder wealth maximization or otherwise. Focusing
on one aspect of the firm at the expense of the other two, however,
obscures the central place of shareholder ends in the corporation.
At its inception, the corporation is nearly indistinguishable from
its shareholders, who possess the special talents or resources around

1. E.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012); Stephen
M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor
Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1435 n.40 (1994) [hereinafter Bainbridge, SWM Norm];
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971,
971 (1992) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Constituency Statutes]; Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical
and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579,
583 n.17 (1992) (citing waves of sources engaging the topic about every 20 years).
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which the enterprise is started. They possess all the property, financial,
and control sticks in the corporate bundle of rights. They associate via
the corporate form to better achieve some end than they could
without it. Shareholders necessarily give up ever more control as the
firm grows. But even at later stages in a firm’s life, shareholders retain
enough rights to entitle them to have their corporations run in pursuit
of the purposes they established at the firm’s founding (or later
modified via the proper procedures).
This Article distinguishes two understandings of the corporate
“purpose” language that is a statutorily required component of every
corporate charter. The first is what the Article terms the corporation’s
“tactical,” or operating, purpose. A corporation engages in its
operations as it pursues its “strategic” purpose. The strategic purpose
is the telos of the corporation or its board of directors. Shareholder
wealth maximization is the archetypical strategic purpose, and the one
most naturally derived from the corporate bundle of rights.
The Article addresses the assertion that corporate law does not, at
least by default, require directors to maximize shareholder wealth, and
concludes that this claim is indefensible when viewed in proper
context. This fundamental stockholder right established, the Article
proposes expanding existing law to allow stockholders to charter
corporations for any lawful strategic purpose, given sufficient notice
to potential mid-stream shareholders. It thus argues for a clarification
of the marked uncertainty in corporate law as to whether nonwealth
corporate ends are cognizable. Corporate law provides the pieces to
maximize the social benefit enabled by the corporate form. This
Article offers a flexible yet simple way to join those pieces together by
permitting, but not requiring, stockholders to depart from the wealth
maximization norm.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I situates the discussion
of purpose amidst the three primary theories of corporate governance,
lays out the Article’s working model of the corporate bundle of sticks,
and sets forth its definition of corporate purpose. Part II interrogates
the five primary arguments against the shareholder wealth
maximization norm. Part III proposes that shareholders be allowed to
depart from the norm by forming corporations to pursue their choice
of strategic purposes. It also addresses accountability concerns raised
by the proposal.
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I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE PURPOSE
This Part begins by reviewing the history and features of the three
ascendant models of corporate governance. It draws on this discourse
to make observations about the characteristics of corporations and
shareholders, the relationships between the two, and the nature of
corporate ends. It then discusses states’ reasons for chartering
corporations. It thus lays out the analytical framework for the
remainder of the Article.
A. Corporate Governance Frameworks
The major milestones in corporate theory over the last quarter
millennium situate the three dominant models of corporate
governance: shareholder primacy, director primacy, and the teamproduction model.
In his renowned 1776 treatise The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith
presented the classical view of the corporation owned by its
shareholders and managed on their behalf:
The directors of [corporations], . . . being the managers rather of
other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected,
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their
own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention
to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give
themselves a dispensation from having it. 2

Professors Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means echoed this
conception of the firm 157 years later in their famous The Modern
Corporation and Private Property. They focused on the “separation of
ownership and control” in diffusely held firms like public corporations
in which traditional incidents of ownership were no longer vested in
an individual or a small group with detailed knowledge of the firm’s
business. 3 The separation made shareholder-owners even more
vulnerable to managerial self-dealing than they were in Adam Smith’s
time.

2. 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 233 (Edwin Cannan ed., Methuen & Co. 1904) (1776); see id. at 232–48.
3. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4–6, 70–72, 89–93 (1933).
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Economist Milton Friedman summarized the view that managers
worked for stockholders in 1970:
In a free enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is
an employee of the owners of the business. He has [a] direct
responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the
business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to
make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules
of the society . . . . Insofar as his actions in accord with his “social
responsibility” reduce returns to stockholders, he is spending their
money. 4

Although Professor Friedman is frequently quoted for his support of
shareholder wealth maximization, his careful use of the word
“generally” suggests that, although it may not be commonplace, he
apparently believed that shareholder ends need not be monetary.
Six years later, Professors Michael C. Jensen and William H.
Meckling solidified the agency theory of the firm, under which
managers work to generate profits for their shareholder principals.5
They also popularized the nexus-of-contracts view, which
characterizes corporations as “legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a
set of contracting relationships among individuals.” 6 Although agency
theory strongly implies firm ownership by the principals, and Jensen
and Meckling referred to shareholders as “owners,” 7 their analysis also
suggests that shareholders are merely providers of one of the inputs—
capital—needed to run the firm. 8
In 1991, Professors Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel
wholeheartedly adopted the contractarian view of the firm in their
influential The Economic Structure of Corporate Law. 9 They abandoned
4. Milton Friedman & Craig P. Dunn, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, § 6, at 32, 33 (emphasis added).
5. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–09 (1976).
6. Id. at 310–11. Professors Jensen and Meckling found roots for their work in that of
Arman Alchian and Harold Demsetz on corporations and property rights. Id. at 307 & n.5.
Professors Alchian and Demsetz referred to the firm as a “centralized contractual agent in a team
productive process.” Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777–78 (1972).
7. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 308–09, 317–19.
8. See id. at 311.
9. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 1–39, 91 (1991).
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the notion that shareholders own the firm, but nevertheless continued
to assert that managers were shareholders’ agents. 10
Shareholder Primacy and Director Primacy stem from, and Team
Production responds to, 11 these frameworks. Each contains both
descriptive and normative elements. Director Primacy and Team
Production proponents acknowledge that their frameworks are less
descriptive in the context of a controlling shareholder. 12 Some of the
models’ features nevertheless depend on assumptions related to the
firm’s founding. Those features are addressed in this and the
next section.
1. Shareholder primacy
Shareholder primacy is based primarily on the view that
shareholders own the corporation. But, in some iterations, it takes on
contractarian attributes.
Classic shareholder primacy holds that corporate managers 13 work
for shareholder-owners. 14 The shareholders, who risked their wealth
to enable the enterprise, are entitled to have the firm run for their
benefit and have a “residual” claim on anything left over after the
firm’s contractual obligations have been fulfilled. 15 Managers have
incentive to shirk because they do not receive all of the marginal

10. Id. passim; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26
J.L. & ECON. 395, 396 (1983) (“Shareholders are no more the ‘owners’ of the firm than are
bondholders, other creditors, and employees (including managers) who devote specialized
resources to the enterprise . . . .”).
11. Professors Blair and Stout also found roots for their Team Production model in
economists Armen Alchian’s and Harold Demsetz’s work on coordination in complex
productive processes. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 265–68 (1999); see supra note 6.
12. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 596–97 (2003); Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 256, 281,
309.
13. This Article’s references to managers includes directors unless stated otherwise.
14. E.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, passim; Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth
Maximization and Its Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 396–97
(2014); see supra text accompanying notes 3–8; infra Section II.A.1.
15. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, passim; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 311–12;
cf. Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 791 (Del. Ch. 1987) (contrasting the contractual rights of
bondholders and fiduciary duties owed to shareholders to protect their interests); Harff v.
Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 218–19 (Del. Ch. 1974) (stating that stock ownership is evidence of
the ownership of corporate assets rather than a debt owed by the corporation).
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benefits of their work, as a 100-percent owner-manager would.16
Being self-interested, they will attempt to run firms to maximize their
own well-being rather than that of their shareholder principals. 17 This
incentive misalignment causes the firm to be run inefficiently—in a
way that creates less overall value—with the resulting loss of value
termed “agency costs.” 18 To minimize agency costs, managers are
legally required to exert their best efforts to maximize shareholder
wealth. 19 With this corporate goal fixed, nonshareholder
constituencies—managers,
employees,
customers,
creditors,
communities, and others—can contract ex ante for their fair share of
the value created by the corporation. 20
In its contractarian iteration, shareholder primacy views the
corporation as a contract-facilitation entity that serves as a natural
nexus for production factors. In its most property-oriented form,
shareholders still own the company, but they do business in the
corporate form because it catalyzes the contracting with managers,
employees, and others that is needed for production. 21 Importantly, it
allows contracts that would have to be negotiated individually across
markets to be brought into the firm and directed in a command-andcontrol fashion. 22 At its other extreme, shareholder primacy eschews
the notion of the corporation as a thing capable of being owned.
Under this version, shareholders merely provide capital to the
corporation in exchange for a residual claim on its assets. 23

16. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 312–13.
17. Lucian Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833,
850 (2005); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 308.
18. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 308–10.
19. Other ways to reduce agency costs include setting up performance monitoring and
evaluation systems, compensation schemes, and internal rules to minimize managerial selfdealing. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 308–09, 328.
20. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L. REV. 439, 441 (2001).
21. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. Professors Margaret M. Blair and Lynn
A. Stout employ the catalysis portion of this contractarianism in their Team Production model.
See supra note 11; infra Section I.A.3.
22. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, ECONOMICA, Nov. 1937, at 386, 390–98.
The need for these contracts may be anticipated or unanticipated.
23. See Sharfman, supra note 14, at 397; Alexei M. Marcoux, For Shareholder Wealth
Maximization, Against Corporate Purpose, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Dec. 5, 2013),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/for-shareholder-wealth-maximization-againstcorporate-purpose; supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge
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2. Director primacy
Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge’s Director Primacy framework is
purely contractarian, viewing firms as incapable of either being owned
or having a defined purpose. 24 Shareholders supply capital in an
implicit exchange for the residual claim on the firm’s assets. 25 Director
primacy sees the board of directors, rather than the firm or its
stockholders, as the sui generis nexus of contracts that hires production
factors. 26 The board is not an agent of the shareholders, but the
supreme power in a web of contractual relationships that includes it.27
The board is therefore most like the firm’s “owner.” 28
Director Primacy’s key objection to classical Shareholder
Primacy’s view of shareholders as owners is that shareholders do not
exhibit many of the usual characteristics of owners, most notably
control over the corporation’s assets or activities. 29 Professor
Bainbridge is known for saying that “the board acts and the
shareholders, at most, react” to the board’s actions. 30 Strong central
decision-making authority in the board is necessary, however, to run
the corporation (or, at least public ones) effectively. 31 Yet because the
board can abuse its power to its members’ advantage, it is legally
obliged via fiduciary duties to maximize the wealth of the shareholder
residual claimants. 32

employs this form of contractarianism in his Director Primacy model. See supra note 12; infra
Section I.A.2.
24. Stephen
M.
Bainbridge,
The
vacuity
of
corporate
purpose,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 5, 2012), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professo
rbainbridgecom/2012/05/the-vacuity-of-corporate-purpose.html; see also WILLIAM A. KLEIN
ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 117–22 (11th ed. 2010) (acknowledging that
the law treats corporations as real entities, but arguing that this approach is improper as a matter
of theory because firms are human instrumentalities).
25. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 563.
26. Id. at 550, 559–60.
27. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 83, 102 (2004).
28. Id. at 102–03.
29. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 563–74.
30. Id. at 559; see id. at 563, 570.
31. Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 86, 103; see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
32. Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 103; Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 563–65.
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3. Team production
The Team Production model’s distinguishing characteristic is that
it disavows the notion that board members are shareholders’ agents
who have a duty to maximize shareholder wealth. 33 Rather, the board’s
role is to act as a group of “mediating hierarch[s]” that “protect[s]
the enterprise-specific investments of . . . the corporate ‘team,’
including shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and
possibly other groups, such as creditors” and “the local community.” 34
Team members hire the board to protect them from each other’s
opportunism and to coordinate their production activities. 35 They thus
opt into the hierarchy to mutually relinquish to the board of directors
their rights over firm-specific inputs. 36 This mutual hands-tying makes
it safe for team members to make long-term investments which are
difficult to protect via explicit contract, but are essential for the firm
to operate efficiently and profitably. 37 Free of responsibility to any one
group, directors are able to serve the entire team. 38
The Team Production model is contractarian, but “not so much a
‘nexus of contracts’ . . . as a ‘nexus of firm-specific investments.’”39
Like Director Primacy, it holds that shareholders do not own firms. 40
Rather, “[c]orporations [or at least public ones] are independent legal
entities that own themselves.” 41 Contrary to Director Primacy, the
Team Production model posits that, although the corporation exists,
shareholders (and presumably the other team members) are
“fictional,” at least from the standpoint of the corporate entity. 42

33. Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 248–49.
34. Id. at 250, 253.
35. Id. at 280.
36. Id. at 274, 277.
37. Id. at 253, 275, 277, 285.
38. Id. at 288. Professors Blair and Stout find support for their view in the managerfriendly nature of the business judgment rule. Id. at 298–309.
39. Id. at 275, 285.
40. STOUT, supra note 1, at 8.
41. Id. at 37; see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
42. Id. at 59–60, 86–87, 89.
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B. The Property-Contract-Association Triality 43
Despite their differing theoretical underpinnings, each framework
described in the previous section possesses varying descriptive strength
depending on the firm’s particulars and the situation in which it finds
itself. This section begins by analyzing the shareholder’s interest in the
corporate bundle of sticks as the firm proceeds from its founding. It
continues with a description of its approach to “corporate purpose.”
The section concludes with a note on the state’s purpose in chartering
corporations.
1. The corporate bundle of sticks
This section portrays a typical founding of a firm and its growth
into a public corporation. 44 It traces the development of the corporate
bundle of sticks, 45 tying in each corporate-governance model’s
characterization of the firm, to show that shareholders retain enough
sticks to entitle them to corporate pursuit of their charter-specified
ends.
a. The early stages. A new corporation enjoys a great deal of unity
with its founder-owner. Once the charter 46 is in hand, the founder may
cause the new firm to issue all its shares to him or her, or to multiple
individuals. The new share owner or owners may put cash or property
into the firm, or provide it only with services. In the case of a single

43. This section is named after the Wave-Particle Duality of Light. After centuries of
debate over whether light consisted of particles or waves, modern physics has confirmed that it
can, independently and simultaneously, be characterized as both. E.g., Kenneth R. Spring &
Michael W. Davidson, Light: Particle or a Wave?, MOLECULAR EXPRESSIONS,
http://micro.magnet.fsu.edu/primer/lightandcolor/particleorwave.html (last visited Sept.
8, 2016).
44. The real but stylized examples in this section are just a few of the near-infinite number
of variations on a firm’s life cycle. Hybrids of the stages described herein of course exist. This
will not, however, typically change the analysis.
45. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 6, at 783 (referring to the corporate “bundle
of rights”).
46. Traditionally, the charter consisted of the articles of incorporation filed by the founder
along with the certificate of incorporation issued by the state of incorporation. Delaware and the
Model Business Corporation Act have eliminated this procedure, replacing it with one in which
the articles are made official by a stamp indicating the time of filing. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
103(c)(3) (Supp. 2014); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 1.25, 2.03 & cmts. 1–3. Delaware has
further complicated matters by referring to the articles as the certificate. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, §§ 101–103 (2011 & Supp. 2014, 2015).
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shareholder, the founder is likely to elect him- or herself the sole
director. This “election” is likely to be a nonevent, with the owner
simply proceeding to do business in the corporate name. If there are
multiple original shareholders, the selection of directors may be more
formal, but still consist of little more than a conversation or e-mail
exchange among the founding team. The original group is almost
certain to run the firm, hiring employees to do basic tasks as needed.
The group’s members, who would be unlikely to entrust their financial
futures to strangers, will be well acquainted. Professor Henry
Mintzberg refers to this organizational form as the Simple Structure.47
A Simple Structure nearly indistinguishable from its owners is the
incorporated family farm. 48 The family, which generally incorporates
to receive limited-liability protection or realize tax benefits,49
comprises the farm’s shareholders and runs the farm essentially as it
would without the benefit of incorporation. 50 Its entire life, including
its home, is the farm.
The law recognizes and embraces this unity. Subchapter S of
Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code provides perhaps the most
ubiquitous example, 51 allowing a corporation’s shareholders to select
“S corporation” status for the firm to cause it to be taxed on a passthrough basis. 52 The tax code effectively treats an act of the s-corp as
an act of the shareholders—every dollar that the firm pays for, say,
health insurance, 53 is one that is neither earned by nor attributed to
the shareholders. Corporate law’s veil-piercing doctrines recognize

47. HENRY MINTZBERG, STRUCTURE IN FIVES: DESIGNING EFFECTIVE
ORGANIZATIONS 159 (1993); see id. at 157–61 (describing the Simple Structure).
48. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hedge, 375 N.W.2d 477 (Minn. 1985) (finding identity between
the incorporated farm and its sole shareholder for the purposes of a Minnesota’s
homestead exemption).
49. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 117–22.
50. See State Bank in Eden Valley v. Euerle Farms, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Minn.
App. 1989) (“[T]here was a strong degree of identity between the Euerles and Euerle Farms.”).
51. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1361–79 (2012 & Supp. 2014, 2015); Drew DeSilver, What is a ‘closely
held corporation,’ anyway, and how many are there?, PEW RES. CTR. (July 7, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/07/what-is-a-closely-held-corporationanyway-and-how-many-are-there/.
52. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1362–63, 1366 (2012 & Supp. 2014).
53. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Drew DeSilver,
supra note 51 (noting that Hobby Lobby is an S corporation).
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that corporations and their shareholders can be indistinguishable. 54
The veil may be pierced because shareholders attempt to use the
corporate form improperly to avoid personal liability, 55 or in
recognition of the corporation’s role as a placeholder for shareholders’
rights or an “extension of [their] beliefs,” neither of which are
abandoned when they associate via the corporate form. 56
Early-stage corporations fit well into the Shareholder Primacy
framework. The shareholders behave as owners in all relevant ways,
including controlling the firm’s activities and assets. They are also able
to control and police employee behavior and honesty. The board of
directors is likely composed of the shareholders or those loyal to them.
Profits earned or losses suffered by the firm are generally income or
losses to the shareholders. That a court can pierce the corporate veil is
evidence that shareholders own the firm: if the firm owned itself, there
would be no one to whom to pierce. Stockholders’ unity with their
corporations means that their choices directly impact their well-being,
making pursuit of nonwealth goals unproblematic.
It is difficult to maintain that a sui generis board hired capital (i.e.,
the shareholders who started the firm and elected the board); the
board hires other production factors in place of shareholders only to
54. In the family-farm cases, discussed supra notes 48 and 50, the court used reverse veil
piercing to arrive at the unity of identity where the farms’ natural owners enjoyed greater legal
protections from creditors than did corporations. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Using Reverse Veil
Piercing to Vindicate the Free Exercise Rights of Incorporated Entities, 16 GREEN BAG 2d 235,
243–46 (2013).
55. E.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966).
56. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Townley
Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 620 (9th Cir. 1988); Tyndale House Pubs., Inc. v. Sebelius,
904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 115, 117 n.11 (D.D.C. 2012); Roepke v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 302
N.W.2d 350, 351–53 (Minn. 1981); see id. at 352 (noting that other states have applied the
doctrine in probate cases) (citing State v. North, 32 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1947); In re Burr’s Estate,
24 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sur. Ct. 1941); In re Estate of Greenfield, 321 A.2d 922 (Pa. 1974)); supra
notes 48–50; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus
Brief in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 4–5 & nn.17–18
(citing sources characterizing corporations as associations of individuals).
Family law also recognizes the concept, although it does not refer to it as veil piercing,
when determining alimony, child support, and asset allocation between divorcing spouses. Brief
of Amici Curiae Freedom X, et al. at 11–13 & nn.29–37, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
& Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354; 13356) (citing cases from nine states).
The concept is not new. See Daniel Lipton, Corporate Capacity for Crime and Politics:
Defining Corporate Personhood at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 96 VA. L. REV. 1911,
1942–44 (2010) (citing early cases).
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the extent that it is separate from them. 57 It is likewise difficult to
maintain that nonshareholder production factors joined to hire the
board. 58 Shareholders are almost certainly the ones with the special
talent, product, or resource around which the enterprise was started. 59
Other constituencies like rank-and-file employees, creditors, or
communities may not yet be in the picture.
Shareholders set the corporation’s terms via the articles of
incorporation at its formation. (The articles serve as a contract
between the shareholders, in accord with the contractarian view of the
firm. 60) Their power is at its apex because they have not given away
any of the sticks in the corporate bundle. Barring conflict among
them, shareholders run their firm to achieve their desired ends, which
may be laid out in the charter. In the event of conflict, the court will
hold shareholders to their charter, though it is uncertain that courts
would enforce a charter term opting out of shareholder wealth
maximization. 61 The next question is whether and to what extent
shareholder rights and their corporate ends survive as their firm
outgrows the Simple Structure.
b. Growth. As firms mature, they develop systems and
infrastructures to facilitate efficient output creation. Firms of this
complexity necessarily have components beyond direct shareholder
reach, necessitating professional managers. Standardization becomes
ever more necessary, both for internal monitoring and efficient
production. Professor Mintzberg calls the fully mature version of such

57. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
58. Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 277 (describing the hiring and the giving up of rights
in question as taking place when the corporation is formed); see supra text accompanying note
35. But cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 281 (describing the act of going public as the one
that opts into the mediating hierarchy model).
59. Cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 275. All of this is subject, of course, to each
party’s relative bargaining power. When an “idea person” and a “money person” join to form a
corporation, it is typically not merely the idea person who takes an equity stake. The money
person will also take one, whether or not he or she also works for the firm. A special enough
employee may likewise be able to bargain for equity, but at that point he or she becomes a
shareholder with something special to offer the enterprise.
60. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939–40 (Del.
Ch. 2013).
61. See infra Section III.A. Although the enforceability under current law of a charter
provision opting out of shareholder wealth maximization is questionable, this Article argues that
one should be cognizable if effectively noticed.
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a firm a Machine Bureaucracy, and notes that it is characterized by
centralized control, formality, and conflict among groups that
comprise the organization. 62
Share ownership may have spread beyond the founders, 63 but it is
still a close corporation in which many of the original owners take an
active managerial role. Ownership and control, therefore, are typically
“joined in the hands of the small class of incorporators” that holds a
majority of shares, 64 but that control is less direct and the minority can
only influence firm affairs at the majority’s pleasure.
Shareholder Primacy continues to have descriptive value. As in
earlier stages, it is difficult to characterize anyone but the shareholders
as hiring directors. “[T]he controlling shareholder or shareholder
group enjoy[s] near-absolute power to determine the firm’s future.”65
The minority can (in theory) enforce its rights via direct and derivative
suits, connoting that shareholders own the firm and employ the
directors to pursue their ends. Veil piercing continues to be viable
because abusive shareholders’ assets are still relatively easily targeted
via lawsuit. Yet shareholders have given up some of their control sticks
by delegating a significant number of business decisions to managers.
But an enterprise’s being successful enough that stockholders require
managerial assistance to run it does not mean that they have given up
their rights to their contracted-for ends, as expressed in the corporate
charter.
In line with Director Primacy, the board, directly and via
subordinates, regularly hires production factors. To prevent abuse,
directors owe fiduciary duties to all shareholders, including the
minority, which can typically be fulfilled by treating the financial
interests of all shareholders, qua shareholders, equally. 66 Yet to the
extent that the board is composed of controlling shareholders’

62. MINTZBERG, supra note 47, at 167–69, 171, 183, 280–81. Public corporations may
also be machine bureaucracies. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
63. Shares may become dispersed if the original shareholders sell, cause the firm to issue
more shares to raise capital (such as when the firm goes public, discussed infra), or bequeath
their shares to multiple parties.
64. Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign
Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 906 (2004). This ownership structure typified even the largest
firms of the first half of the nineteenth century. Id.
65. STOUT, supra note 1, at 16.
66. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
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representatives, 67
the
control
group
can
easily
oust
disfavored directors.
As Team Production predicts, however, the business judgment
rule (BJR) makes it difficult for noncontrolling shareholders to
vindicate their rights, freeing the board to act mostly as it pleases. 68
The board’s centralized power is consistent with its need to coordinate
and rein in conflict among the organization’s internal constituencies.
It must do so effectively if the firm is to produce efficiently.
Nonetheless, the control group can replace the board anytime. And a
classic corporate-law problem is that control groups, via their boards,
abuse minorities’ rights.
The shareholder class, therefore, continues to retain most control,
and it can quickly retake that which it has delegated. Shareholders
possessing minority interests have less power than others, but they are
still owed fiduciary duties by the board and the shareholders who
control it. 69 Intrashareholder duties may be difficult to enforce,
especially when combined with the board’s BJR protection. 70 But
courts are more willing to find fiduciary duty violations in close
corporations than public ones. 71 And the difficulty in proving a
violation is a BJR feature that protects corporate pursuit of its purpose
by insulating managerial decisions from opportunistic or litigious
shareholders 72 in all but the most egregious cases of wrongdoing.73
Shareholders, in sum, properly retain the right to have the firm run in

67. As opposed to the controlling shareholders themselves.
68. Shareholders can seek redress by voting or suing. Their voting rights are limited to
electing directors, approving charter and by-law amendments, mergers and sales of substantially
all of the corporation’s assets, and voluntary dissolution; they have no authority to dictate
expenditures made in the ordinary course of business. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 211
(2011 & Supp. 2015). As a practical matter, even the activities on which they may vote are
subject to significant board influence. See Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 105 & n.133; Winkler,
supra note 64, at 902–03; J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Governance, Profit Maximization,
and Hobby Lobby (Part I), THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (July 10, 2014),
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/the-sec-governance/corporate-governance-profitmaximization-and-hobby-lobby-par-1.html.
69. See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013); Sinclair Oil, 280 A.2d
at 720, 723.
70. See infra note 185 and accompanying text; see also infra Section II.B.
71. Perhaps because inter-shareholder abuse born of voting control is easier to identify
than managerial abuse in a public corporation.
72. See infra Section II.B.2–3.
73. See infra Section II.B.1.
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accord with their original contract, whether it calls for the pursuit of
wealth or another end. 74
c. Going public. Although some firms remain private while they
take advantage of economies of scale and scope to expand, the capital
inflow generated by going public can finance growth exceptionally
well. As shares are issued, their ownership becomes diffuse. Where a
large enough block exists to constitute de facto control, the analysis is
similar to that in the preceding section. 75 When no group is able to
maintain control, the board of directors indeed becomes the supreme
acting entity in the corporation, while shareholders are typically
relegated to reacting to board decisions, and only if they can overcome
collective-action problems. 76 The firms’ size typically makes central
authority necessary while making comprehensive central control
impossible. 77 Boards, therefore, monitor divisions to which acting
authority has been delegated. Professor Mintzberg calls this structure
the Divisionalized Form, and notes that it is characterized by output
standardization, autonomous divisions centrally monitored against
quantitative goals, and central control primarily of division
leadership. 78 Most control, in other words, is at least two steps
removed from shareholders. 79
Occam’s razor 80 counsels that, even in relinquishing control in
order to go public, stockholders retain enough rights from their
74. See infra Section III.B; see also STOUT, supra note 1, at 16.
75. See ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE
LAW § 10.04[D] & n.162 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing de facto control).
76. See supra note 68 and accompanying text; see also text accompanying note 30.
77. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 61–81 (1974).
78. MINTZBERG, supra note 47, at 215–25. Each division is essentially a self-contained
entity that is monitored by and receives some support from the central authority (i.e., the board
of directors and its direct reports in a typical corporation).
79. The divisions can be of different forms, including Simple Structures, Machine
Bureaucracies, and other structures lacking strong central control. Id. at 217, 219, 224. The
result is that intradivision control may also be decentralized.
80. Occam’s razor is the problem-solving principle that “the simplest of competing
theories is preferable to the more complex ones.” BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S MODERN
AMERICAN USAGE 584 (3d ed. 2009). More appropriately for present purposes,
As Occam’s Razor warns, once the possibility of a more complex palette of human
motivation is introduced, the power of [a] theory sharply declines, for unless [one]
can specify when self-interest will trump ideology (or a sense of fairness, or professional
socialization, or whatever other motive) it will prove of little use either descriptively
or prescriptively.
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bundles to make it worth their while. For the founders, this almost
certainly includes wealth creation alongside other personal goals. 81 For
those who buy into a firm in which they lack control, wealth is more
likely their motivation. Absent an explicit relinquishment, one should
not assume that stockholders surrender their rights to their monetary
or nonmonetary corporate ends to directors and other constituencies.
After all, those rights are all that the shareholders have left.
Shareholders presumably give up their sticks on the best available
terms. The residual-interest/wealth-maximization stick is the most
versatile of the bundle, 82 allowing stockholders to pursue charitable
and other nonwealth goals without a corporate or board intermediary
deciding where to donate. It is presumably the right that they would
relinquish last. Because profit motivates most stock purchases, one
should assume, as the law does, that shareholders retain the wealthmaximization stick. 83
Shareholder wealth maximization is thus a prerequisite, of sorts,
to the existence of other purposes. Once established, stockholders
should be free to alter firm ends if they believe that their nonwealth

Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of Occam’s Razor,
28 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 109, 116 (2000).
81. See, e.g., J. Travis Laster, Revlon is a Standard of Review: Why it’s True and What it
Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 12–14 (2013). Although going public is an efficient
way to value the firm, cash out, and get rich, these are not founders’ only motivations.
82. After all, each shareholder knows best which causes he or she would most like to
support. It may be most efficient for a shareholder to make money through his or her share
ownership, and donate the money as desired.
83. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 469 n.16 (2002);
SEC, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 35 (1980); Roberta Romano,
Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1599, 1611–12 (1989); see infra Part II. Although investors typically buy stock hoping to
make money, profit need not be their only motivation.
Delaware is the de facto leader in corporate law which other jurisdictions regularly imitate.
This Article thus focuses primarily, but not exclusively, on its laws and jurisprudence. Although
Delaware and most states’ laws adopt shareholder wealth maximization as law, see infra Part II,
there are rare outliers where the strength of the norm is less certain—where it is less conclusive
as a matter of positive law that stockholders retain the residual interest stick from the corporate
bundle. See, e.g., Intertherm, Inc. v. Olympic Homes Sys., Inc., 569 S.W.2d 467, 471 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1978) (“As a fiduciary, the officer or director has a strong influence on how the
corporation conducts its affairs, and a correspondingly strong duty not to conduct those affairs
to the unfair detriment of others, such as minority shareholders or creditors, who also have
legitimate interests in the corporation but lack the power of the fiduciary.”). To the extent that
this is the case, this Article argues that they should.
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goals are best pursued via the corporate form and they sufficiently give
notice to future share buyers.
To the extent that shareholder control is at its nadir while
shareholder wealth maximization supported by enforceable fiduciary
duties lives on, Director Primacy accurately portrays the public
Divisionalized Form. It is also consistent with widespread share
ownership that shareholders would relinquish significant power to
enable board members to take actions without cumbersome secondguessing by multiple shareholders. 84 Nevertheless, shareholders do
have ultimate voting power, which they have occasionally used, for
example, to resist takeovers. 85
Team Production’s characterization of the board as a mediating
body is descriptive inasmuch as the firms’ divisions and other internal
constituencies must be treated fairly and work together as needed, and
shareholders need insulation from each other’s opportunism. Yet it
becomes harder to explain why it is proper for a board to be hired by,
and thus work for, a factor with at least some interests directly adverse
to the firm, like creditor-vendors or communities with whom tax deals
may be sought, when the board properly acts as a trustee for the
corporation. 86 It is also difficult to reconcile, absent an explicit choice
to that effect, a decision by previously empowered shareholders to opt
into a system that deprives them of their default and most versatile
corporate stick, 87 and one that need not be surrendered to reduce
transaction costs—the right to profits. Shareholder hands-tying does,
however, facilitate widespread stock ownership and all that it enables.88
To the extent that veil piercing is no longer feasible because board
members rather than shareholders are culpable for corporate
wrongdoing, shareholders have indeed become more of a nonentity
in the firm. But to the extent that that doctrine is unworkable merely
because of the logistics of getting to many shareholders’ assets, it does
not diminish the notion that shareholders own the firm, as

84. See infra Sections II.B.2–3; accord infra note 88 and accompanying text.
85. E.g., RITA RICARDO-CAMPBELL, RESISTING HOSTILE TAKEOVERS: THE CASE OF
GILLETTE 165–216 (1997).
86. Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 280–81, 291; see also infra Section II.A.1.
87. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying and following text.
88. See infra Sections I.B.2.b, II.B.3; accord supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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Shareholder Primacy holds. 89 Shareholders are empowered to bring
both direct and derivative suits, suggesting that they have retained the
right to have directors work toward their ends. All of these
characteristics are consistent with both wealth and nonwealth goals.
2. On purpose
The previous section shows that the corporation is a multifaceted
entity capable of characterization across many dimensions. This
section first distills the previous one’s observations into the concept of
a flexible, shareholder driven, corporate purpose. It then briefly
discusses the state’s reasons for chartering corporations.
a. Corporate ends. Corporations may be characterized as a
coincidence of property, contractual, and associational rights. The
Simple Structure, especially in its extreme forms like incorporated
family farms, is most clearly its shareholders’ property. At this stage,
all incidents of ownership—all sticks in the ownership bundle—are in
the shareholders’ hands. They relinquish some sticks as the firm grows,
but not their residual interest. This interest, this Article asserts, entitles
shareholders to have their firms run either to maximize their wealth
or to further other contracted-for ends. 90 This is equally true both of
founding shareholders, who once possessed a complete property
interest, and those who buy into the firm later. Shareholders do,
however, surrender most control by the time the corporation goes
public. But “separating control from ownership does not divest the

89. The doctrine could be workable if blame for bad acts could be isolated to a few
shareholders. Cf. Stark v. Coker, 129 P.2d 390 (Cal. 1942); Jewell v. Victorian Vill. Internal
Med., No. 08AP-919, 2009 WL 1314876, at *2 (Ohio App. May 12, 2009) (unpublished).
90. See infra Section III.A for a proposal of how shareholders may opt out of having the
firm run for their benefit. In effect, instead of taking possession of the profit and spending it on
their desired nonwealth goals, they have the firm do it for them. See supra note 82 and
accompanying text.
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owner of his rights.” 91 The separation strikes this balance for the
owners’ benefit, as discussed in Part II. 92
The corporation is, simultaneously, a contract-facilitation entity. It
internalizes contracts to save transaction costs and to alleviate the cost
of incompleteness in a long-term relationship. 93 It also serves as a focal
point at which production factors and customers voluntarily make
value-creating exchanges. 94 But the contractarian account that denies
corporate existence, and therefore purpose, 95 does not fully account
for the firm as a historical bundle of rights, significant components of
which shareholders retain. A natural corollary of the retention of
rights is that the shareholder-owners are entitled to the wealth
generated by their corporation, absent an explicit agreement to the
contrary. 96 Under a purely contractarian account of the firm, by
contrast, shareholder entitlement to anything must be intuited absent
an explicit contract to that effect. 97
Corporations, therefore, are not merely nexuses of contracts. 98
Although they need human action to enter into contracts, the
contracts bind the firms even absent human agents. They are generally
parties to the contracts for which they (or their boards) are nexuses.

91. Bainbridge, SWM Norm, supra note 1, at 1426 n.9 (emphasis added). This statement
implies that there is something of the corporation to own. Some Delaware cases agree. E.g., N.
Am. Catholic Edu. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007); Stahl v.
Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1124 (Del. Ch. 1990); see also Fox v. CDX Holdings, Inc.,
C.A. No. 8031-VCL, 2015 WL 4571398 at *1, *24 (Del. Ch. July 28, 2015) (referring both
to shareholders as owners and the influence of Director Primacy). But see Bainbridge, SWM
Norm, supra note 1, at 1427 (stating that firms are not things that can be owned).
92. See infra Section II.B.2–3; see also supra text accompanying notes 37, 84.
93. “Over the course of such a relationship, issues arise that the participants did not
anticipate. If it were possible to create a contract that specified every contingency at
the outset (it is not), it would be costly beyond belief. The corporation facilitates the
resolution of unforeseen issues by investing managers with command authority to
address unanticipated circumstances without bargaining.”
George A. Mocsary, Why the Corporation is Not Merely a Nexus of Contracts: A Response to Alexei
Marcoux, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.libertylawsite.org/libertyforum/why-the-corporation-is-not-merely-a-nexus-of-contracts.
94. Marcoux, supra note 23. A “focal point” is a result to which individuals tend to
gravitate in the absence of a distinct plan. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF
CONFLICT 57–63 (1980).
95. Marcoux, supra note 23; Bainbridge, supra note 24.
96. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
97. See supra text accompanying note 25.
98. For more, see Mocsary, supra note 93.
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Upon breach, corporations may be sued and their assets may be
attached. They pay taxes. Corporations also enjoy constitutional and
other higher-order rights that only make sense if they are placeholders
for individuals. 99
Associational rights, in other words, are entwined in the
corporation. These rights can be seen as arising both from
shareholders’ mutual ownership of the corporate entity and their
contracting through it. “Whether or not one accepts the notion that
a corporation is a ‘person,’ some corporations are personal and
associational in nature; that is, they are formed and owned by a single
individual or by people who have decided to act in concert to
undertake a trade or business.” 100 When shareholders join together in
a corporation, they do so to achieve their goals more efficiently than
they otherwise could. 101 That the collective undertaking is pursued via
the corporate form need not strip it of its end. 102 Stockholders choose
their undertaking’s terms, including its end, at the firm’s founding.
Later shareholders opt into the terms when buying their shares. 103
Shareholders, managers, suppliers, and others have different
individual purposes for contracting with one another. As the
99. See supra note 56 and accompanying text; Ilya Somin, Religious Freedom in the
Commercial Sphere, STAN. U. PRESS BLOG (Sept. 30, 2014), http://stanfordpress.
typepad.com/blog/2014/09/religious-freedom-in-the-commercial-sphere.html; cf. KLEIN ET
AL., supra note 24, at 119–20 (describing the use of “loan-out corporations” to obtain legal
benefits for their sole shareholders).
The coincidence between some corporate and individual rights (whether statutory,
constitutional, common-law based, etc.) does not mean that firms should always be treated as
unitary with their shareholders. That would undermine some of the reasons for associating via
the corporate form. See supra Section I.B.2.b; infra Section II.B.2–3.
100. J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit
Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created and Suggestions for Change, 2 AM.
U. J. L. & BUS. 85, 102 (2012).
101. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 121–22 (describing the use of a shell corporation
to make a merger more efficient); WILLIAM W. COOK, 1 A TREATISE ON STOCK AND
STOCKHOLDERS, BONDS, MORTGAGES, AND GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 1 n.1 (3d ed.
1894); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (“A
corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends.”).
102. It may do just that, however, if incorporation necessarily causes a legally mandated
rule to displace the founders’ original contract. This would happen, for example, if positive law
required directors to run a corporation to maximize shareholder wealth, or to serve
nonshareholder constituencies, irrespective of the founders’ wishes.
103. Or they step into the shoes of the previous shareholders some other way, depending
on how they acquired their shares. Charter amendments can change the terms mid-stream, to
some stockholders’ potential detriment. See infra Section III.C.2.
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corporation aggregates these contracts, it aligns them toward the
corporate purpose. “If . . . the invisible, intangible essence or air,
which we term a corporation, can level mountains, fill up valleys, lay
down iron tracks, and run railroad cars on them,—it can intend to do
it.” 104 Or, at least, the law can require managers to act as if the firm
had such an intent. The law should attempt to keep corporate
direction true while ensuring that all constituencies receive the
benefits of their bargains.
Managerial responsibility to pursue the corporate purpose
becomes part of some contracts (e.g., those of managers), and dictates
whether the firm enters into others (e.g., contracts with suppliers). It
is the attainment of the corporate purpose that the board of directors
must deploy its efforts and the firm’s resources. The board binds itself,
under rules set by corporate law, to do so. 105 This Article proposes that
the law recognize (1) both profit-based ends—for shareholders’ or
another constituency’s benefit—and those unrelated to wealth; and
(2) that a diffusely held firm, including a fully Divisionalized Form,
can inherit such a purpose.
b. The state’s purpose in chartering corporations. Governments
charter corporations because they make great contributions to the
prosperity of modern economies. The benefits include those resulting
from the state’s selling the privilege of incorporation, liability risk
reduction, capital lock-in, and efficient transacting. Allowing
corporations to pursue ends other than shareholder wealth should
expand the number of corporations in existence, fueling more growth.
At the basest level, corporations provide revenue for the state in
the form of filing and renewal fees, 106 create an extra level of taxation
on corporate income, 107 and create a mechanism by which payroll and
other taxes are reliably collected. The remaining business-enabling
features, discussed next, create employment, a greater tax base, and a
general circulation of wealth that results in economic growth.

104. JOEL P. BISHOP, 1 NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW UPON A NEW
SYSTEM OF LEGAL EXPOSITION § 417(4) (8th ed. 1892).
105. If the board resigned, a new one would be bound to pursue the same end.
106. It is safe to say that Delaware’s revenue from corporate filings alleviates its citizens’
tax burden, for example, by making a sales tax unnecessary.
107. Subchapter S corporations are the noteworthy exception. See supra text accompanying
notes 51–53.
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Nicholas Murray Butler, former President of Columbia University
and Nobel Peace Prize winner, said that “the limited liability
corporation is the greatest single discovery of modern times, whether
you judge it by its social, by its ethical, by its industrial or, in the long
run,—after we understand it and know how to use it,—by its political,
effects.” 108 Limited liability shields shareholders from liability for their
managers’ and co-owners’ acts, enabling diversification and closer-tooptimal risk taking. 109 This allows corporations to serve as laboratories,
encouraging the private sector to experiment on socially beneficial
undertakings. 110 Under the contrary partnership rule where partners
are jointly and severally liable for the partnership’s debts, few
individuals would be willing to become fellow shareholders with many
strangers. 111 Without limited liability, modern corporations and the
vastly expanded number of large undertakings that they make possible
would be all but infeasible.
The corporate form also facilitates efficient transactions between
the parties who meet at the nexus of contracts. It alleviates the holdup problem, allowing investors to tie up capital with each other for
the firms’ potentially perpetual existence.112 A shareholder cannot
cripple the enterprise by unilaterally withdrawing its investment,
unlike a partner who typically can. 113 Shareholders also protect

108. He continued: “Even steam and electricity are far less important than the limited
liability corporation, and they would be reduced to comparative impotence without it.” Nicholas
Murray Butler, President, Columbia Univ., Address at the 143rd Annual Banquet of the
Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York (Nov. 16, 1911).
109. Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). Absent
protection, managers will tend to pursue less risky projects even if they have a lower expected
payoff. Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 110–14. Shielding managers will incent them to undertake
riskier projects with greater expected payoffs. Id. Shareholders tend not to mind the risk because
they can diversify it away. Id. But see George A. Mocsary, Statistically Insignificant Deaths:
Disclosing Drug Harms to Investors (and Patients) Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 111, 160 (2013) (noting that investors value predictability).
110. Cf. Roberta Romano, The State as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State
Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 210 (2006).
111. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 41–42.
112. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 404 (2003) (discussing “the problem
that arises when one partner uses the threat of walking away from the business . . . to extract a
greater share of the rents from the others”); see also In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d
17, 37 & n.4 (“Equity capital, by default, is permanent capital.”).
113. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 601 (1997); see also, STOUT, supra note 1, at 77–78.
Assuming that stock markets are semi-strong efficient, as most scholars and economists believe,
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themselves from each other by limiting their respective control rights
over firm activities. 114 Corporations also reduce transaction costs by
internalizing transactions, assuaging the costs of negotiating them
across markets. 115 As President Butler said, “[The corporate form]
substitutes co-operation on a large scale for individual, cut-throat,
parochial, competition.” 116
These benefits are consistent with, but neither depend on nor
necessitate, a shareholder-profit goal: Shareholders desiring corporate
ends other than wealth maximization ought to be able to purchase
limited-liability protection. Capital lock-in can equally enable private
undertakings and public works, which may be contracted out to
existing private corporations or done by corporations directly
chartered for the purpose. 117 Efficient transacting benefits all
undertakings. Yet the state, by selling the right to incorporate to the
wealth-seeking supermajority of stockholders, also produces social
benefits.
II. SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION IS THE NORM AND THE
LAW
A corollary to the combination of (1) shareholders retaining the
residual-interest stick from the corporate bundle, (2) that stick being
the most versatile of the bunch, and (3) most stockholders investing
in firms to make money, is that shareholder wealth maximization is the
most natural default corporate purpose. This Part examines five of the
most common objections to the shareholder wealth maximization
norm and concludes that each is lacking. It also shows how facets of
each claim that appear to weaken the norm in fact evince stockholderdriven corporate purpose. Part III builds on shareholder wealth
maximization, showing that the law’s recognition of nonwealth

infra note 201, a selling shareholder bears his or her share of a firm’s public bad decisions, which
have been capitalized into its stock price; buying shareholders bear the risk of unpublicized bad
decisions. Loose distribution rules, however, undermine this benefit. See George A. Mocsary,
The Embedded Firm: Corporate Governance, Labor, and Finance Capitalism—Commentary, 3
ACCT., ECON. & L. 123, 126 (2014).
114. See infra Section II.B.3.
115. See Coase, supra note 22.
116. Butler, supra note 108, at 47.
117. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN
THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970, at 16–17 (1970).
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corporate purposes would be both feasible and socially beneficial, and
advocates for their validity.
A. Claim #1: Improper Reliance on Dodge v. Ford
One objection is that the germinal case of Dodge v. Ford Motor
either (1) improperly invented the shareholder wealth
Co.
maximization norm, (2) is improperly relied upon as precedent for the
norm, or (3) was in fact about shareholder, rather than directorial,
fiduciary duties. 119 The Dodge brothers, founders of the eponymous
car maker and Ford shareholders, sued Ford to compel the continued
payment of special dividends and enjoin the construction of a new
manufacturing plant. 120 In response to statements and testimony by
controlling shareholder Henry Ford that he was running Ford Motor
Company for the benefit of employees, customers, and others, the
Michigan Supreme Court compelled the dividend payment but
allowed the plant to be built, stating:
118

There should be no confusion (of which there is evidence) of the
duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe
to the general public and the duties which in law he and his
codirectors owe to protesting, minority shareholders. A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for
that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice
of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the
end itself, to the reduction of profits, or the nondistribution of
profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other
purposes. 121

As a threshold matter, any defects in Dodge or its interpretations
are irrelevant because Delaware courts have repeatedly reaffirmed the
shareholder wealth maximization norm, including within the last
year. 122 That said, Dodge is instructive for its enunciation of the
118. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
119. E.g., Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 163 (2008).
120. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 673, 677.
121. Id. at 683–84, 685; ALLAN NEVINS & FRANK E. HILL, FORD: EXPANSION AND
CHALLENGE, 1915–1933, at 99–100 (1957).
122. See infra Section II.C.1 and notes therein; RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Jervis, 129
A.3d 816, 849 (Del. 2016) (“Revlon neither creates a new type of fiduciary duty in the sale-of-
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longstanding view that managers must run their corporations for
stockholder benefit.
1. Dodge embodies ubiquitous societal understanding
Some have argued that Dodge’s statement of corporate purpose
was dicta unsubstantiated by legal authority. 123 Yet Dodge merely made
explicit that which had been an implicit and axiomatic part of the
common law and general societal agreement. Societal understanding
is critical to defining the corporate contract’s implicit terms because
constituencies “ought to get out of their agreements what they were
promised in their agreements.” 124
Dodge’s view of shareholders as the corporation’s residual
claimants to whom the directors owe a duty of wealth maximization
was a succinct restatement of the preceding several decades of
Michigan common law. 125 Hunter v. Roberts, Thorp & Co., 126 in
particular, cited in Dodge’s analysis of whether a dividend should be
forced, 127 is strikingly similar to Dodge and is especially instructive.
Roberts, Thorp & Co., a manufacturer of threshing machines, was
control context nor alters the nature of the fiduciary duties that generally apply. Rather, Revlon
emphasizes that the board must perform its fiduciary duties in the service of a specific objective:
maximizing the sale price of the enterprise.”) (quoting Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075,
1083–84 (Del.2001)); Andrikopoulos v. Silicon Valley Innovation Co., 120 A.3d 19, 25 (Del.
Ch. 2015); In re Books-A-Million, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 11343-VCL, 2016 WL
5874974, *11–12 (Oct. 10, 2016); OptimisCorp v. Waite, C.A. No. 8773-VCP, 2015 WL
5147038, *61 & n.520 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2015); In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., C.A. No. 9322–
VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, *25–26 (Del Ch. May 31, 2016).
123. Stout, supra note 119, at 167–68; Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law
After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 12 (2015).
124. Marcoux, supra note 23.
125. See Union City Lumber Co. v. Traverse City, L & M Ry. Co., 136 N.W. 463, 468
(Mich. 1912) (“Stockholders of a corporation are permitted . . . to have a proportional share in
corporate success.”); Stroh v. City of Detroit, 90 N.W. 1029, 1030 (Mich. 1902) (“[I]t is
undeniable that [shareholders] bear the burden of the tax imposed upon the corporation,
inasmuch as the shareholders constitute the corporation and indirectly own its property.”);
Ackenhausen v. People’s Sav. Bank, 68 N.W. 118, 120 (Mich. 1896) (noting that depositors
have a contractual relationship with a bank by which their interests are protected while “the
profits of the business all belong to the stockholders.”); Butterfield v. Beardsley, 28 Mich. 412,
425 (1874) (“If a quantity of oil had been drawn from a company well it must have belonged
to the company, and ultimately to the shareholders according to their respective stockholding
rights. The same must be true of the well itself, and of the other property.”); infra notes 126–
132 and accompanying text.
126. 47 N.W. 131 (Mich. 1890).
127. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 673, 682 (Mich. 1919).
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sued by a former shareholder’s estate to compel the payment of
dividends. 128 Unlike in Dodge, the board maintained that it refrained
from paying dividends as part of its long-term business strategy. 129 The
Supreme Court of Michigan ratified the lower court’s statement that:
“It is undoubtedly true that the ultimate object for which every
corporation of the character of the one under consideration [machine
manufacturing] is formed, is the payment of dividends to its individual
members.” 130 Directors, the court said, “are the legally appointed
agents and trustees of the stockholders.” 131 The dissent agreed on both
points. 132 Other states had similar case law, 133 and contemporaneous
treatises agreed. 134 Diffusely held corporations were among those
128. Hunter, 47 N.W. at 131. Suits attempting to compel the payment of dividends were
not uncommon around the turn of the century.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 131, 133. Absent disparate tax treatment, dividends and capital appreciation are
interchangeable ways in which to realize gains on a stock investment.
131. Id. at 133.
132. Id. at 138, 139.
133. See, e.g., U.S. Radiator Corp. v. State, 101 N.E. 783, 785 (N.Y. 1913) (“A share of
corporate stock is the right which the shareholder has to participate . . . in the surplus profits of
the corporation on a division, and in the assets or capital stock remaining after payment of its
debts on its dissolution or the termination of its active existence and operation.”); People ex rel
Venner v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 111 A.D. 183, 187 (N.Y. App. Div. 1906) (“The stock owned by
[a shareholder] makes him the equitable owner of an undivided fractional part of the future
assets of the company . . . . The stockholder’s rights in the profits of the business flow from his
proprietary interest, and have no analogy to the rights of a contract creditor.”); Lord v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc., 94 N.Y.S. 65, 78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1905) (“Directors of a corporation are not
vested with the title to the property of the corporation. They are agents of the corporation, upon
whom duties devolve of management and care—the exercise of corporate powers for the benefit
of the equitable owners of the corporate property, the stockholders. The directors are the
trustees, and the stockholders are the cestuis que trust.” (quoting Dykman v. Kenney, 154 N.Y.
483, 491 (1897)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); Jones v. Terre Haute &
Richmond R.R. Co., 57 N.Y. 196, 205, 206 (1874) (“[A] stockholder in a corporation has an
interest, in proportion to his stock, in all the corporate property, and has a right to share in any
surplus of profits arising from its use and employment in the business of the company” and “[the
corporation’s] affairs [are] managed by the directors as trustees for the stockholders.”); King v.
Patterson & Hudson R.R. Co., 29 N.J.L. 82, 88 (1860) (“The directors are the agents of the
corporation, and in their official capacity agents of the stockholders also.”); Brightwell v.
Mallory, 18 Tenn. 196, 198 (1836) (stating stock entitles its holder “to his proportion of the
profits or dividends which may be declared from time to time, and, when the institution closes
the business, to his proportion of the capital stock and profits which may remain to be divided”).
134. ARTHUR W. MACHEN, JR., 1 A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§§ 496, 508, 1313 (1908); COOK, supra note 101, §§ 12, 641, 643, 648 (aggregating dozens
of cases); HENRY O. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS HAVING
CAPITAL STOCK §§ 558–59, 564, 567, 692 (1884).
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understood to be managed for shareholder benefit. 135 Stockholders’
contracts with their firms demanded wealth maximization.
The Great Wall Street Scandal of 1905 provided an opportunity
for all facets of society to express their views on the topic. The scandal
was ignited by the revelation that managers of several insurance
companies—the corporations most quickly and thoroughly to adopt a
business model separating ownership from control—were using
company funds for both direct personal benefit and to finance political
campaigns. 136 The uproar over the contributions and abuses was
massive, and based primarily on the common understanding that
corporate managers were “thieves and embezzlers” improperly
spending “other people’s money” 137—money that belonged to
policyholder- and stockholder-owners. 138 It soon became clear that
other firms’ managers were equally culpable. 139 Condemnation was
universal, coming from the public, 140 media, 141 religious leaders,142
congress, 144
and
even
President
state
politicians, 143
145
Theodore Roosevelt.
Managers were seen as both stealing outright and creating “forced
political association” 146 between owners and candidates whom the
owners disfavored, and who enacted laws insulating managers from
owner lawsuit. 147 One writer described these latter measures as

135. Small investor groups dominated even the largest firms until the mid-nineteenth
century. Winkler, supra note 64, at 906–12. Soon thereafter, however, starting with railroads
and insurance companies and spreading rapidly to other firms, separation of ownership from
control became the norm. Id.
136. Id. at 887–93.
137. Id. at 887, 893.
138. Some insurance companies were organized as mutual companies, where policyholders
are the firms’ owners and are entitled to dividends, while others were organized as stock
corporations. Id. at 901. Both policyholders and stockholders were considered owners from
whom managers were stealing. Id. at 900–01, 905–06, 910–11. “[T]he funds held by the firm
did not belong to the company per se as some distinct entity with its ‘own’ money.” Id. at 894.
139. See id. at 906–12.
140. Id. at 891, 893–95.
141. Id. at 893, 915–16.
142. Id. at 893–94.
143. Id. at 888, 893.
144. Id. at 924, 929.
145. Id. at 920.
146. Id. at 895–98.
147. Id. at 907–09; see id. at 909–12.
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“designed to protect the policy-holders from their own servants.” 148
Managers defended on the ground that they were serving owner
interests, referring to themselves as the owners’ trustees.149
Shareholder and policyholder interests were the benchmark. That
ownership and control diverged was not seen as destroying ownership
interests. The principal-agent view of the firm was taken for granted.150
This understanding continues.
Notwithstanding the potential—and actual—managerial abuse
that accompanied the rise of the manager-controlled corporation, the
model was spectacularly successful, resulting in extraordinary
growth. 151 Yet the costs of weaker managerial accountability were
impossible to ignore. The new model’s unprecedented capacity for
wealth creation ensured its survival, 152 even while the potential for
managerial abuse ballooned. It is logical, therefore, that courts would
make the shareholder-wealth-maximization standard of conduct more
explicit, while preserving the benefits that came with the new
manager-friendly standard of review. 153 This era also saw the advent of
the BJR. 154 Section B analyzes the BJR after the following brief
discussion of how construing Dodge as a controlling-shareholder case
is consistent with the shareholder wealth maximization norm.
2. A controlling-shareholder analysis of Dodge supports a shareholderdriven approach to corporate purpose
Some scholars view Dodge as standing only for the proposition that
majority shareholder Henry Ford could not freeze “protesting,
minority stockholders”—the Dodge brothers—out of their special
dividends. 155 Ford very likely was attempting to deprive the Dodge
148. Id. at 900 (quoting The Skeleton in the Insurance Closet, COLLIER’S, Oct. 14, 1905,
at 13) (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 890, 898.
150. Id. at 873–76, 911–14, 918–23.
151. Id. at 909–10; see also STOUT, supra note 1, at 103–04.
152. See Sharfman, supra note 14, at 401–06; text accompanying note 151.
153. See infra Section II.B.1.
154. Id. at 908.
155. E.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 315–20
(1998); Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 301–02; Cynthia Williams, The Future of Shareholder
Wealth Maximization: A Response to George Mocsary, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Dec. 23, 2013),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/the-future-of-shareholder-wealth-maximizationa-response-to-george-mocsary.
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brothers of Ford’s generous special dividends, which the Dodge
brothers were using to finance their car company. 156 Yet an improper157
dividend freeze-out is at base a situation in which shareholder wealth
is not being maximized in a close corporation. In the archetypical
situation, managers redistribute wealth to themselves at the expense
of shareholders generally. In a freeze-out, a controlling shareholder or
group, through board control, appropriates wealth from a subset of
shareholders. 158 Both are unacceptable because they impede long-term
stockholder wealth. Both apply with equal strength to situations
where managers or empowered shareholders are impeding other
nonwealth corporate ends.
If, as interest-balancing theories suggest, the board of directors
has plenary power159 in a firm to serve various constituent interests as
corporate (as opposed to shareholder) needs dictate, then Henry Ford
did exactly what he was supposed to via his board: fight off a genuinely
threatening 160 competitor. He was thus serving all corporate
constituencies by working toward the continued health of Ford Motor
Company. Indeed, and also in accord with shareholder-interest-driven
theories, he pursued even the Dodge brothers’ interests, qua Ford

The reason not to view Dodge as a freeze-out case is that the court tied its prohibition on
the nondistribution of profits to Ford’s (supposed) altruism. Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 684
(Mich. 1919); see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is Dodge v. Ford Motor Company a close
corporation/controlling shareholder case?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 5, 2012),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/is-dodge-v-fordmotor-company-a-close-corporationcontrolling-shareholder-case.html.
156. See NEVINS & HILL, supra note 121, at 89–91 (noting that Ford’s proposal would
have left the Dodge brothers with a $120,000/year normal dividend instead of
$1,200,000/year if the special dividend were also paid); Smith, supra note 155, at 316 & n.201;
Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 301 & n.132.
157. It is proper for a board to refuse to pay dividends to pursue long-term firm value
rather than accede to a short-term demand for cash from a minority shareholder.
158. In the absence of dividend payments, minority shareholders can only see a return on
their investments by collecting a salary or selling their shares to realize capital gain. Cf. supra
note 130. The former is only possible if the controlling shareholder assents, and the latter is
typically very difficult in the absence of a public share market. That said, shares of the
spectacularly successful Ford Motor Company were likely much easier to sell to a third party
than other stock was, albeit at a risk discount. By contrast, even in the absence of a dividend, a
controlling shareholder can pay him or herself a salary and sell his or her controlling interest to
fully realize capital gain.
159. See supra Section I.A.3; infra Section II.E.
160. NEVINS & HILL, supra note 121, at 8, 394.

1348

2.MOCSARY.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1319

10/1/16 12:31 PM

Freedom of Corporate Purpose

shareholders, via the increase in value that Ford Motor Company
would see from Dodge Motorcar’s loss of a reliable source of capital.
B. Claim #2: The Business Judgment Rule Does Not Require Managers
to Maximize Shareholder Wealth
The next argument is that managers have no “enforceable legal
duty to maximize shareholder wealth” because, under the BJR, they
have wide autonomy in managing their firms’ affairs and are routinely
exculpated from liability despite having lost firm money. 161 This
argument conflates the standard of managerial conduct with the
standard that courts use to review it. Managerial duties to pursue
shareholder wealth are regularly enforced with varying standards of
review appropriate to different situations. These standards, which
developed organically through the common law, presumably strike an
equilibrium between shareholder power and managerial
accountability. They are consistent with enabling boards to efficiently
pursue stockholder ends.
1. The business judgment rule
Managers must attempt to maximize shareholder wealth, but they
need not succeed. Shareholder wealth maximization, as it is
adjudicated under the BJR, is a standard of conduct to which
managers must adhere. It does not require a particular financial result,
much less optimal decision making that results in actual wealth
maximization. Managers incur no liability for injury to their
corporations resulting from actions pursued in good faith and with
reasonable care.
The BJR is the standard against which manager pursuit of
shareholder wealth is reviewed. Absent some incentive irregularity—
evidence suggesting that managers either acted self-interestedly or
otherwise contrary to their duties—courts will abstain from a fairness
review of managerial decisions and presume that they were made in
pursuit of shareholder wealth. 162 In this case, the review is essentially
161. STOUT, supra note 1, at 25, 29–31; see, e.g., David Millon, Radical Shareholder
Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1020 (2013); Mitchell, supra note 1, at 623–24, 626,
631–32.
162. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see Kamin v. Am. Exp. Co., 383
N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (Sup. Ct. 1976). This Article’s framework for analyzing the BJR considers
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no review. If an incentive irregularity is present, however, the depth of
review varies.
Where managers’ acts are not suspected of being tainted with a
financial interest, lack of independence, or an entrenchment motive,
scrutiny remains low. Courts will typically intervene only if managers
were grossly negligent in informing themselves about an issue;163
“absent a conscious decision, failed to act”; 164 had no rational basis for
their decision; 165 or engaged in fraud or other illegality. 166 A finding of
fault under these categories is rare—to the point that they are best
thought
of
as
indicators
of
an
otherwise
unseen
167
incentive irregularity.
When the board must decide whether to accept a takeover bid,
there is an “omnipresent specter” of board entrenchment at
shareholder expense because bid acceptance will usually result in the
board members’ losing their jobs. 168 If the board rejects a bid, Unocal
the typical categorization of inquiries into managerial behavior concerning the duties of loyalty
and care largely irrelevant. See, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944)
(distinguishing between the BJR and the “rule of undivided loyalty”). But see Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (referring to good faith as “a key ingredient of the business
judgment rule”). Relevant for present purposes are the situations in which courts will employ
their equity powers not to defer to the board’s broad statutory authority to run the firm. Bodell
v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 140 A. 264, 267 (1927). The Delaware Supreme Court firmly
presumed the validity of board actions. Id. The Chancery Court, which perhaps better explained
the tension between statutory authority and equity, instead put the burden on the board to prove
the fairness of the challenged transaction. Bodell v. Gen. Gas and Elec. Corp., 132 A. 442, 446,
448 (Del. Ch. 1926).
163. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
164. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 & n.7; see Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814
(N.J. 1981).
165. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.
1971)).
166. Sinclair Oil, 280 A.2d at 722; Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779–80 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1968); Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 812; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d
693, 753 (Del. Ch. 2005).
167. In the case of a positive law violation, proof of the violation serves to create liability.
Yet even this category may be considered a sign of a hidden incentive irregularity given that the
violation may have been committed to advance corporate goals. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393
N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979) (dealing with bribes made to secure business). In cases where the
manager benefits from the illegality, he or she has a material financial interest or is simply robbing
the firm. See infra text accompanying note 171.
168. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954, 955 (Del. 1985); see also
Laster, supra note 81, at 11–18 & n.45 (listing reasons for managerial misbehavior in the
takeover context); J. Travis Laster, Omnicare’s Silver Lining, 38 J. CORP. L. 795, 808–11, 816
(2013) (same).
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Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum mandates an intermediate level of scrutiny:
the board must prove that it reasonably perceived a threat to the
corporate enterprise and that its response was “reasonable in relation
to the threat posed.” 169 If the board makes this showing, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to show another reason for overturning the
board’s decision. 170
Where managers have a material financial interest in their decisions
or lack independence, the incentive irregularity is obvious and courts
will shift the burden of proof to managers and require them to prove
that their actions were entirely fair to the corporation. 171
2. The rule as bargain between shareholders and management
This combination of a strict wealth maximization principle and a
stepped standard of review results from an implicit bargain 172 between
shareholders and managers: shareholders would not invest in a firm if
managers could whimsically deploy their investment to serve other
constituencies, and managers would not work for a firm if accepting
employment meant that they had to guarantee optimal returns.
Managers know the business under their charge best, and should
be allowed to use their discretion in running it. The BJR protects
managers from shareholder second-guessing. It is in shareholders’
interests to offer managers this protection for actions taken in good
169. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953, 955. The distinction between Unocal, which applies in
contexts where there is no inevitable sale of the company or transfer of control that would subject
shareholders to the risks and consequences borne by holders of minority shares, and Revlon v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), which applies where such a sale or
transfer of control is certain, is discussed supra Section II.C.1 and note 203. Revlon is properly
considered a subcategory of Unocal in which the board has fewer courses of action available to
it. See Laster, Revlon, supra note 81, at 11–12; David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose,
10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 188–93, 198–202 (2013). Revlon thus provides an intermediateplus form of scrutiny.
170. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (requiring “judicial examination at the threshold before the
protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred”). The Unocal test is quite
permissive in its implementation. Bernard S. Sharfman, The Tension Between Hedge Fund
Activism and Corporate Law, 1 J. L., ECON. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2016).
171. Laster, supra note 168, at 812; Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del.
1983); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); see Sharfman, supra note 14, at
399, 410.
172. That it is a bargain is evidenced by the ability of the shareholders to alter the default
terms of their relationship with managers in the certificate of incorporation. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 141(a) (Supp. 2015); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (2011)
(statutory close corporations); accord infra note 178.
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faith and with appropriate care to ensure closer-to-optimal managerial
risk taking. 173 Shareholders thus bind themselves to be unable to sue
managers, save in the presence of grave incentive irregularity or
potential for abuse. 174
In the absence of abuse, less day-to-day accountability to
shareholders—more authority in the board—is typically more efficient
because it reduces transaction costs, facilitates coordination, reduces
the cost of disputes, and the like. 175 Yet when an incentive irregularity
is present, the need for accountability176 increases. The BJR’s stepped
standard of review fulfills the bargain between shareholders and
managers.
3. The rule as bargain among shareholders
The BJR, combined with public shareholders’ meager retained
control rights, 177 also fulfills a hands-tying bargain among
shareholders. 178 Managers have the most direct knowledge about the
business, and are therefore best positioned to make corporate
decisions. 179 Individual shareholders, with their diverging interests,
benefit by enabling managers to act independently, free of the risk of
other shareholders suing managers for making “wrong” decisions that
were undesirable to the plaintiffs only. 180 Some shareholders would
lack the resources to sue, resulting in managers catering to both
litigious shareholders and judicial expectations. 181 A positive side effect
of this bargain is that shareholders are also less able to act

173. See supra note 108.
174. See Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 108–09; Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 312; supra
Section II.B.1. Even uninhibited by the BJR, shareholders only get to make a case on the merits.
175. See Sharfman, supra note 14, at 402–05; Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 105–06.
176. “Accountability” means just that—that managers must account for their actions. If
they do they are not liable. See supra Section II.B.1; supra note 174.
177. See supra note 68.
178. As with the bargain between shareholders and management, this contract is alterable.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 141(a) (Supp. 2015); see also id. § 351 (allowing statutory
close corporations); accord supra note 172.
179. See Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 106.
180. STOUT, supra note 1, at 9, 68, 76–83; Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 557.
181. See Sharfman, supra note 14, at 409; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director
Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769 (2006).

1352

2.MOCSARY.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1319

10/1/16 12:31 PM

Freedom of Corporate Purpose

opportunistically, to the business’s long-run detriment, with respect
to other constituencies. 182
It is also inefficient and expensive for the firm and its managers to
be fighting lawsuits rather than pursuing the firm’s ends. Given that
managers are the best-positioned decision makers, the BJR is therefore
also a contract among shareholders to keep judges, who “are not
business experts” and are expensive to use, from deciding firm
policy. 183
***
Weakness is a strength when it comes to credible commitment.
Shareholders voluntarily tie their hands vis-à-vis managers and one
another—and, by extension, employees, bondholders, and other
constituencies—via the BJR to enable their collective enterprise to
efficiently pursue their ends. The law assumes, but the BJR’s reasoning
does not demand, a pecuniary end. Shareholders are entitled to have
their firms run to pursue those ends, 184 and retain the ability to enforce
their rights in the most obviously dire circumstances. An unfortunate
side effect of this bargain, however, is that it provides good cover for
managerial actions misaligned with shareholder goals. 185 That does
not, however, change the propriety of those actions. 186

182. See STOUT, supra note 1, at 74, 80, 85; infra text accompanying and following
note 226.
183. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see Bainbridge, supra
note 27, at 106, 117–24. This notion is not new. Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 47 N.W.
131, 131 (Mich. 1890) (“Whether a corporation can safely make a dividend involves the exercise
of knowledge and judgment, and the power of deciding this question should not be taken from
the directors, and assumed by the courts, unless it clearly appears that the directors have mistaken
their legal duties. Any other rule would lead to the frequent intervention of the courts, to the
substitution of the court for the board of directors, and in very many instances, would prove
disastrous to the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders, and the business . . .
would be seriously hampered and retarded.”).
184. The opposite view taken to its extreme, would allow, for example, a target board in a
takeover bid to reject the bid purely for the benefit of the bidder’s shareholders, who the board
may believe are not getting a good value. Supra Section I.A.3; STOUT, supra note 1, at 88–89.
185. See STOUT, supra note 1, at 32–33; Laster, Revlon, supra note 81, at 28 (observing
that an admission of improper behavior is all but necessary under the lowest levels of BJR
review); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit
Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 15 (2012) (same). Compare infra text
accompanying notes 190–191 (discussing the negative effects on shareholders of potentially
disloyal actions by Time’s board) with infra text accompanying notes 192–193 (discussing the
positive effects on shareholders of likely proper actions by Airgas’s board).
186. Accord Yosifon, supra note 169, at 223–26. Scholars differ on the extent to which
shareholder wealth is pursued by managers. See infra notes 357–358 and accompanying text.
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C. Claim #3: The Common Law Has Disclaimed Shareholder Wealth
Maximization
Just as the common law has not indirectly foreclosed shareholder
wealth maximization via the BJR, it has not done so directly, either.
The arguments to the contrary fall into two categories: (1) the
Delaware Supreme Court has not stated that shareholder wealth
maximization is the standard to which corporate boards’ conduct is
held, and (2) boards’ fiduciary duties run to “the corporation and its
shareholders,” rather than solely to the shareholders. These arguments
are grounded in judicial language that, viewed in isolation, may
suggest that pursuing shareholder interests is optional. When
examined in proper context, however, it is clear that the referenced
language mandates long-term pursuit of stockholder interests, which
are appropriately presumed to be shareholder value which may (but
need not) be best achieved by maximizing stock price today.
1. The proper time horizon
Many cases contain disclaimers of short-term shareholder wealth
maximization that, read in isolation, may be read to disclaim wealth
maximization altogether. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time
Inc. and Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas Inc., for example,
state that a corporate board “is not under any per se duty to maximize
shareholder value in the short term.” 187 Both courts note, however,
that the boards’ actions were acceptable because they were pursuing
“long-term value for the stockholders.” 188 In Unocal and elsewhere,
187. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 98 (Del. Ch. 2011) (citing
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990)); see, e.g., STOUT,
supra note 1, at 30 (citing Airgas as a disclaimer of shareholder wealth maximization); Blair &
Stout, supra note 11, at 304 & n.146 (noting that the Time court allowed the board to reject a
tender offer to preserve “Time culture,” with no connection to long-term shareholder wealth);
Williams, supra note 155 (same).
188. Time, 571 A.2d at 1149; Airgas, 16 A.3d at 102; see Time, 571 A.2d at 1148–50,
1153–55; Airgas, 16 A.3d at 99–103.
Other commonly cited disclaimers of short-termism include Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) and Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct.
1968); see, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 303, 308; Mitchell, supra note 1, at 613. The
Unocal court stated that in deciding whether to fight a takeover bid, a board may consider, in
addition to the price, “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors,
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally).” Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
But as Professor David G. Yosifon ably shows, these constituencies may only be considered if
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Delaware’s Supreme and Chancery Courts have affirmed that it is a
“basic principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in
the best interests of the corporation’s stockholders,” and have a “legal
responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for the benefit
of its shareholder owners.” 189
One might answer that both the Time and Airgas boards’ actions
were “demonstrably not shareholder wealth maximizing” because
they declined to sell their firms for a substantial premium. 190 This is
certainly true, in hindsight, in Time’s case where its board turned
down an 80% per-share premium from Paramount only to see Time’s
stock price gain a paltry 3.5% over the next fourteen years. 191 Airgas’s
stock price, however, “has remained above the offer price, and, in fact,

doing so bears some connection to long-term stockholder wealth. Yosifon, supra note 169, at
188–93, 198–202. The Unocal court said as much on the same page as its famous “constituency”
quote. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (“[C]orporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best
interests of the corporation’s stockholders.”); see id. at 955–56, 956 n.11 (stating that a board
need not accede to the desire of short-term shareholders whose interests may be averse to those
holding for the long term). The Shlensky court did not intervene when the Chicago Cubs’ owner
refused to install lights in Wrigley Field because “baseball is a daytime sport and . . . the
installation of lights and night baseball games [would] have a deteriorating effect upon the
surrounding neighborhood.” Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 778 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Yet the court recognized that such seemingly non-shareholder-serving actions were actually
investments in long-term business reputation and health, wholly consistent with maximizing
shareholder wealth. Id. at 780–81.
189. N. Am. Catholic Edu. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del.
2007) (citing Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998)); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (citing
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)); accord In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73
A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[T]he standard of conduct . . . mandates that directors maximize
the value of the corporation over the long-term for the benefit of the providers of equity capital,
as warranted for an entity with perpetual life in which the residual claimants have locked in their
investment.”); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The theory
of our corporation law confers power upon directors as the agents of the shareholders; it does
not create Platonic masters.”); Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“It is
the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the
corporation’s stockholders . . . .”); see also Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 115 A.3d
535, 546–47, 547 nn.13 & 18, 548 n.19, 551 (Del. Ch. 2015) (interpreting Gheewalla to
require directors to maximize corporate value for the firm’s residual claimants, which are
ordinarily stockholders, but may be creditors if the firm is insolvent). But see Williams, supra
note 155 (“[T]he law—at least as decided by the Delaware Supreme Court—does not yet clearly
articulate shareholder wealth maximizing as the standard of conduct in order for boards to meet
their fiduciary obligations . . . .”). Whether, when, and to what extent other entities may be
classified as residual risk bearers is a topic left for a future work.
190. Williams, supra note 155.
191. Steven Rattner, Merge at Your Own Risk, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2003, at A13.
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has increased nearly 50% [as of 2014].” 192 As of August 2015, Airgas
stock was trading at a 70% premium over the $70 offer price of
December 2009. 193 In May 2016, Airgas was acquired for $143 per
share. 194
In the short run, the BJR demands only loose adherence to
shareholder wealth maximization. 195 Where there is no inevitable sale
of the company, or transfer of control that would subject shareholders
to the risks borne by holders of minority shares, managers may forego
short-run gains in exchange for greater long-term ones. 196 This is a
sensible default rule given the value-destroying potential of shorttermism, 197 despite potentially legitimate disagreement over whether
selling or holding would in fact create more expected present value.198
At the “Revlon moment,” which occurs either when a company is
certain to be sold, or when a transaction causes control to shift from
a diffuse set of shareholders to a concentrated block, managers must
maximize the short-term expected value199 realized by shareholders.200
Courts mandate short-term shareholder wealth maximization in these
situations because they are the last opportunities for shareholders to
fully realize their returns on their investments or for minority

192. Edward B. Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, 21 U. Pa. L. Sch.
Inst. L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 14-37 (alteration in original).
193. Airgas, 16 A.3d at 66; BLOOMBERG FIN. L.P., BLOOMBERG LAW COMPANY REPORT:
AIRGAS, INC. 4 (2015) (custom report of Aug. 11, 2015 on file with author).
194. Air
Liquide
completes
acquisition
of
Airgas,
AIR
LIQUIDE,
http://www.airliquide.com/media/air-liquide-completes-acquisition-airgas (last visited Nov. 2,
2016).
195. See also supra note 161 and accompanying text (citing sources relying on this fact as
evidence against a wealth-maximization fiduciary duty).
196. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 176, 182 (Del.
1986); Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 42–45 (Del. 1993); see also
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); supra note 169.
197. See infra notes 349–357 and accompanying text.
198. Some corporations are properly formed as short-term enterprises. See infra notes 359–
360 and accompanying text.
199. Boards can consider factors other than merely price, including an offer’s feasibility,
financing, legality, risk of nonconsummation, and the bidder’s identity and business experience.
QVC Network, 637 A.2d at 44.
200. Id. at 46–47; Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184. As this Part shows, and contrary to popular
claim, e.g., Williams, supra note 187; STOUT, supra note 1, at 30–31, it is not only at the Revlon
moment that shareholder wealth is the proper endgame. Indeed, it would be arbitrary for a strict
shareholder-wealth-maximization rule to come into play at the end of the firm’s life, but not at
any time before. See also infra text accompanying and following note 226.
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shareholders to be paid for their control premiums. 201 Shareholder
interests have also been aligned because there is no longer a divergence
between those who would like to sell and those who would like to
hold. The short run has caught up to the long run. 202 At this point,
the board of directors’ single-minded goal must be maximizing value
obtained for shareholders’ stock. It may only collaterally—essentially
accidentally—protect nonshareholder interests if those interests create
equivalent or greater value for shareholders. 203 In sum, although
directors “enjoy a remarkably wide range of autonomy in deciding
what to do with the corporation’s earnings and assets,” long-term
shareholder goals—assumed to be, but not logically confined to,
shareholder value—cabin their discretion. 204
2. “The corporation and its shareholders”
Neither, as some assert, has the common law disclaimed
shareholder wealth maximization by describing directors’ duties as

201. Vice Chancellor Laster disagrees, arguing that the possible future loss of a control
premium will be capitalized into current stock price. See Laster, Revlon, supra note 81, at 37–
47. This depends on very accurate knowledge about the future, and in any event, would be
reflected in the stock price as an expected value. When the change in control actually happens,
the full value of the premium is lost.
Similarly, some scholars reject the notion that long-term shareholder wealth maximization
is different from the short term, on the ground that short-term share price is always an accurate
measure of today’s best estimate of future value creation. Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 304.
But see STOUT, supra note 1, at 63–65. But the majority of Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
proponents (including one of its founders, Professor Eugene Fama) acknowledge that only the
semi-strong form of the ECMH is a valid model of share prices, and that even this version is
imperfect. Clifford Asness & John Liew, The Great Divide over Market Efficiency, INST. INV.
(Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Article/3315202/Asset-ManagementEquities/The-Great-Divide-over-Market-Efficiency.html#.WAcCZJMrI5s; Lynn A. Stout, Are
Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L.
REV. 611, 646–56 (1995).
202. TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., CIV. A. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL
20290, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (“In such a setting, for the present shareholders, there is
no long run.”) (unpublished).
203. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185. Revlon is thus a subcategory of Unocal in which boards
must focus directly on maximizing the price obtained by shareholders, considering other
constituencies whose rights are “fixed by contract” only collaterally. Id. at 182. Revlon stated
that it was applying Unocal. Id. at 176, 180–82, 184. Under Unocal, by contrast, boards must
maximize long-term value, and they may do so via the well-being of other constituencies or, if
the present value of selling is greater than that which may be generated by continuing to operate,
by maximizing immediate sale price. See supra notes 169, 188.
204. STOUT, supra note 1, at 31; cf. supra text accompanying note 161.
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flowing to both “the corporation and its shareholders.” 205 This phrase
was made famous in the Delaware Supreme Court case of Guth v.
Loft, 206 and has been cited by many opinions since, including Revlon
and Unocal. But nearly all agree that Revlon requires a stringent form
of shareholder wealth maximization. And Unocal cited Guth for its
proposition that “corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in
the best interests of the corporation’s stockholders.” 207
Guth was a corporate opportunity case in which Loft, Inc., accused
its Vice President, Guth, of usurping a corporate opportunity of Loft’s
for the benefit of a firm owned by him and his family. 208 The injury
allegedly caused by Guth was directly to the corporation, with other
constituencies impacted only indirectly, if at all. By nonetheless
including shareholders—and no other constituency—as beneficiaries
of the board’s fiduciary duties, the court showed that it considered
harm directly to Loft, Inc., as synonymous with harm to Loft’s
shareholder residual claimants, who formed the corporation with their
ends in mind. 209 Revlon’s and Unocal’s reference to the corporation—
when the issue was harm caused directly to shareholders denied a fair
price for their stock—likewise supports this equivalency between
shareholders and the corporation. 210 As Vice Chancellor J. Travis
Laster said, “This formulation captures the intuition that directors
owe duties to the corporation for the ultimate benefit of the residual
claimants.” 211 Much of this intuition applies to the assessment of
nonshareholder constituency statutes, discussed next.

205. E.g., Johnson & Millon, supra note 123 at 13 (citing Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225,
238 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff’d sub nom. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)); Millon, supra
note 161, at 1031 (same); Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 293 n.105 (citing Mills Acquisition
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988)); Williams, supra note 187 (citing
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 952, 954–55).
206. Guth, 5 A.2d at 510, aff’g Loft, 2 A.2d 225.
207. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; see supra notes 200, 205.
208. Guth, 5 A.2d at 505–06, 510.
209. See also Yosifon, supra note 169, at 208–13 (noting that the phrase mentions only the
shareholder constituency).
210. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953.
211. Laster, Revlon, supra note 81, at 28; see Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin,
115 A.3d 535, 546–47, 547 nn.13 & 18, 548 n.19 (Del. Ch. 2015) (Laster, Vice Chancellor)
(directors “owe fiduciary duties to the corporation for the benefit of all of its
residual claimants”).
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D. Claim #4: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes Have Invalidated
the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm
Another argument against the shareholder wealth maximization
norm is that a majority 212 of states (not including Delaware) have
enacted nonshareholder constituency statutes that allow boards to
consider the interests of nonshareholders. 213 One view is that these
statutes allow boards to serve nonshareholders without connecting
their acts to shareholder interests. A more moderate view is that the
statutes reaffirm that corporate boards may in fact pursue
nonshareholder interests purposively or collaterally in their ultimate

212. Sources differ on how many states have enacted such statutes. Compare, e.g., Kathryn
Acello, Having Your Cake and Eating It, Too: Making the Benefit Corporation Work in
Massachusetts, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 91, 100 & n.51 (referring to thirty-three statutes and
citing thirty-one) with Lyman Johnson & Prof. David K. Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby
Lobby 19 (Wash. & Lee Pub. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Accepted Paper No. 2014-19, Oct.
8, 2014) (counting forty-one statutes in this prepublication version of Johnson & Millon, supra
note 123).
This Article considers twenty-nine statutes to qualify because they refer to nonshareholder
interests: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (West 2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3)
(West 2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-221(b)
(2004); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (2013); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.85 (West 2015);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (LexisNexis 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1108A(1) (West
2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (LexisNexis 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
13-C, § 831(6) (2007); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-104(b)(9) (LexisNexis 2014);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, § 8.30(a)(3) (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5)
(West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(1) (West 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.138(4)
(2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN., § 53-11-35(D)
(LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (LexisNexis 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 10-19.1-50(6) (West 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(F) (LexisNexis 2015); OR.
REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2015); 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (West 2013);
7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2007); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-103-204 (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a) (2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
180.0827 (West 2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(g) (2015). Other statutes, like ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. 10-2702 (2013) and VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727.1 (2011), state only that a
corporate board may, in the takeover context, determine that the interests of “the corporation”
or “the corporation and its shareholders,” respectively, “may be best served by the continued
independence of the corporation.” But the board must always decide whether to accept, reject,
or ignore a bid. See supra text accompanying notes 164, 168–170. Virginia’s statute codified the
common law by explicitly requiring directors to consider shareholder interests, even if corporate
and shareholder interests are not seen as coincident. See supra Section II.C.2.
213. E.g., Johnson & Millon, supra note 123, at 14; see Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical
and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579
(1992).
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pursuit of long-term shareholder wealth. 214 Another possibility—
explicitly stated by three constituency statutes and fitting this Article’s
approach to corporate purpose—is that the statutes allow (but do not
require) shareholders to include non-shareholder-oriented purposes in
corporate articles. 215 B Lab, the nonprofit organization that has been
labeling firms meeting its prosocial criteria as “Certified B
Corporations” since 2007, apparently adopts this view. 216
The statutes appear, with some exceptions around the edges and
one caveat, to line up rather consistently behind allowing corporate
boards to consider nonshareholder interests provided that long-term
shareholder wealth is the ultimate goal. All make considering
nonshareholder interests optional in any given situation. 217 At least six
(21%), 218 and as many as thirteen (45%), 219 require directors to
214. See supra Section II.C.1. The narrowest view is that the statutes codify a version of
the business judgment rule under which boards may consider nonshareholder interests only to
maximize today’s stock price. If this were the correct interpretation, there would be no need to
pass the statutes in the first instance.
215. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2104(b)(9) (LexisNexis 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (2012). An interesting
variation on this scenario is that the state chartering agency might include in the certificate of
incorporation purposes unrelated to shareholders as a condition of chartering the corporation.
See supra note 46. (An alternate method for specifying conditions would, of course, be needed
in states with unitary charters. See supra note 48.) This possibility would be most relevant to
corporations otherwise formed to pursue nonmonetary private benefits for their shareholders.
See infra Section III.B.4.
216. Corporation Legal Roadmap, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-bcorp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/legal-roadmap/corporation-legal-roadmap (last visited Sept. 8,
2016) (stating that firms incorporated in states with constituency statutes can serve
nonshareholder interests by including an appropriate charter provision, but that the best that
firms incorporated in other states can do is write up a “Term Sheet [that] commits [the] company
to consider stakeholders to the extent possible within the current corporate laws of [its] state”).
217. None of the statutes require boards to consider nonshareholder interests. See supra
note 212 (citing statutes). In the process, the statutes ensure that no nonshareholders get the
benefit of board fiduciary duties. Some are explicit in this. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5)
(2003); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(6) (2015); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b)
(LexisNexis 2003).
218. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-221(b) (2004); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (2013); MISS.
CODE. ANN. § 79-4-8.30(f) (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (LexisNexis 2004); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(F) (LexisNexis 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(g) (2015).
219. IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1108A(1) (West 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12210(4) (LexisNexis 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 831(6) (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:6-1(2) (West 2003); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 4733-4 (2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 2016). These statutes employ language which
can be understood either to require boards to consider shareholder interests while allowing them
to consider nonshareholder ones, or to make consideration of all constituent interests optional.
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consider shareholder interests; only two (7%) state that boards need
not consider any particular constituency’s interests. 220 Twenty-one
(72%) of the statutes explicitly state that directors may consider the
company’s long-term prospects when discharging their duties. 221 Nine
(31%) of the statutes explicitly apply only in the takeover context, 222
and another fourteen (48%) imply as much by referring to the
corporation’s continued independence. 223
The sparse case law on the matter supports this interpretation by
following the Unocal rule, 224 but adds the caveat that the statutes
generally appear to abrogate the Revlon subspecies of Unocal by
allowing boards to consider nonshareholder interests even when
shareholders will not have a later opportunity to monetize their

Given the strong history of the shareholder wealth maximization norm, the former is more
reasonable.
220. IND. CODE ANN § 23-1-35-1(d) (LexisNexis 2010); 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (West 2013).
221. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (West 2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3)
(West 2016); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-221(b) (2004); IND. CODE ANN § 23-1-35-1(d)
(LexisNexis 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1108A(1) (West 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
271B.12-210(4) (LexisNexis 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, § 8.30(a)(3) (West
2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West 2011); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 79-4-8.30(f)
(2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.138(4) (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2003);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b)
(LexisNexis 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-19.1-50(6) (West 2012); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59(F) (LexisNexis 2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2015); 15 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (West 2013); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (1999); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a) (2010); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 17-16-830(g) (2015).
222. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (West 2015); IOWA CODE ANN. §
490.1108A(1) (West 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (LexisNexis 2012); MD.
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-104(b)(9) (LexisNexis 2014); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(1)
(West 2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2015); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (1999); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (2012). Takeovers were
often seen as value-destroying when most constituency statutes were passed.
223. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-221(b) (2004); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (2013); 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.85 (West 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West 2011);
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 79-4-8.30(f) (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(4) (2015); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y.
BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (LexisNexis 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-19.1-50(6) (West
2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(F) (LexisNexis 2015); 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (West 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a) (2010); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-16-830(g) (2015).
224. See supra notes 169–170 and accompanying text.
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investments. 225 Although certainly a weakening at one corner of the
shareholder wealth maximization norm, Revlon situations are rare.
The statutes can also be seen as legislatures weighing a need to ensure,
at the last period, that nonshareholders get the benefits of their
implicit and explicit contracts with firms 226 against a need to ensure
that shareholders get the benefits of their bargains with their boards.
Inasmuch as stockholders, to protect their interests, yield power to
boards to allow boards credibly to commit to fulfilling their
contractual obligations, such weakening of Revlon is consistent with
shareholder wealth maximization. Given the paucity of decisions on
constituency statutes outside the Unocal/Revlon context, it is reckless
to deem abrogated long-standing common law protecting stockholder
ends.

225. Gut v. MacDonough, No. Civ.A.2007-1083-C., 2007 WL 2410131, at *8–9 (Mass.
Super. Aug. 14, 2007) (unpublished); see also Basswood Partners, L.P. v. NSS Bancorp, Inc., No.
CV9801634128, 1998 WL 59476, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 1998) (holding that
Connecticut’s constituency does not prevent shareholders seeking corporate records to pursue
their ends) (unpublished). These two cases comprise all the decisions by courts of the states that
passed the respective statute. Non-home-state courts tend to agree, but their decisions, of
course, are not binding. Kloha v. Duda, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (M.D. Fla. 2003); Dixon v. Ladish
Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 (E.D. Wis. 2011); Shepard v. Meridian Ins. Grp., Inc., 137 F.
Supp. 2d 1096, 1113 (S.D. Ind. 2001); Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342,
1346 (D. Nev. 1997); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 845 (D. Minn.
1986); First Union Corp. v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-10075, 01-CVS-8036, CIV. A.
01-CVS-4486, 2001 WL 1885686, at *5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001) (concluding that
Illinois’s statute abrogated Revlon); see also Dugan v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc.,
No. 2:09-cv-5099, 2012 WL 6194211, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2012) (holding that
Pennsylvania’s statute does not create a cause of action against directors) (unpublished); Flake v.
Hoskins, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Kan. 1999) (concluding that Revlon does not conflict with
Missouri’s statute); Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., No. 97 C 8003, 1999 WL
601039, at *12–13 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 1998) (concluding that Wisconsin’s statute abrogated
Revlon) (unpublished). But see Nelson v. Ipalco Enters., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1080 (S.D.
Ind. 2007) (appearing to abrogate both Unocal and Revlon); Crandon Capital Partners v. Shelk,
181 P.3d 773, 783 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that New Jersey’s statute abrogated both
Revlon and Unocal). Most scholars agree. See Bainbridge, Constituency Statutes, supra note 1, at
991–94, 1015, 1019; James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes
in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97, 107 (1991). An empirical study by Professors Christopher
Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto, and Anne M. Tucker supports this conclusion.
Christopher Geczy et al., Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 73, 105–14 (2015).
226. See Bainbridge, Constituency Statutes, supra note 1, at 1004–08; Mitchell, supra note
1, at 634–40.
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E. Claim #5: Corporations May Be Formed to Pursue “Any
Lawful Purpose”
A final assertion is that, under Delaware law, a corporation may be
organized for “any lawful business or purposes,” 227 and that because
most corporate charters merely recite this or a similar phrase, directors
of those firms have plenary power to disregard shareholder interests
in favor of other legal goals. 228 This evinces a misunderstanding of
statutory “purpose” language. Current law does not grant managers
free reign to determine—and alter at any given moment—corporate
raison d’etre. This Article does, however, argue for shareholder
freedom to charter corporations to pursue nonstandard ends if
nonfounding shareholders are adequately noticed.
1. The common law makes ignoring shareholder interests unlawful
As an initial matter, this claim circularly implies that corporate
charters can define what is lawful. Shareholder wealth maximization is
a common-law rule, 229 and corporate-law statutes are typically silent
on the matter save in the cabined contexts of constituency statutes230
and special corporation types, like benefit or nonprofit corporations.231
Under their common-law fiduciary duties, it is by default unlawful for
managers not to attempt to maximize shareholder wealth. 232

227. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2011) (“A corporation may be incorporated or
organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes, except as
may otherwise be provided by the Constitution or other law of this State.”) (emphasis added);
id. §102(a)(3) (“It shall be sufficient to state [in the certificate of incorporation], either alone
or with other businesses or purposes, that the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any
lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized under the General Corporation
Law of Delaware, and by such statement all lawful acts and activities shall be within the purposes
of the corporation . . . .”).
228. E.g., STOUT, supra note 1, at 28, 32 (“Directors and executives can run corporations
to maximize shareholder value, but unless the corporate charter provides otherwise, they are free
to pursue any other lawful purpose as well. Maximizing shareholder value is not a managerial
obligation, it is a managerial choice.”); Johnson & Millon, supra note 123, at 8–10, 13–14, 30
(“[T]he board is free to advance the corporation’s mixed objectives over the objections of
shareholders and at the expense of strict shareholder primacy.”) Other states have similar
provisions.
229. See supra Sections II.A–C.
230. See supra Section II.D.
231. See infra Section III.C.1; note 241.
232. See supra Section II.B.1.

1363

2.MOCSARY.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/1/16 12:31 PM

2016

Shareholders may, via charter, only alter a common-law rule if they
steer clear of “a result forbidden by settled rules of public policy.” 233
This test is easily failed by a panoptic view of modern purpose
language: it is unreasonable and unfair to assume that shareholders—
most of whom invest for profit 234—would, by specifying “any lawful
purpose,” enable their boards to further any end desired by managers
at any given moment. It would compound the inequity to presume
that shareholders effectively waive their fiduciary rights given their
bargained-for inability to undo management actions. 235 More
affirmative relinquishment of the wealth-maximization stick is needed
to avoid injustice to equity investors.
2. Tactical versus strategic purpose
Despite managers’ inability to alter corporate ends, shareholders
should be able to grant their boards authority to pursue nonwealth
ends. Disaggregating the concept of corporate purpose into its
“tactical” and “strategic” purposes clarifies both to what corporationlaw statutes typically refer when they speak of “purpose,” and the
spheres in which managers have and lack sovereignty.
A tactical, or operating, purpose is a firm’s allowable sphere of
business, like selling insurance, 236 brewing beer, 237 operating a
railroad, 238 or making musical instruments. 239 Tactical purposes were
once part of the basis for cabining a firm’s activities and liability via
the mostly abolished ultra vires doctrine. 240 A corporation engages in
233. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 117–18 (Del. 1952).
234. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Section II.B.2–3; see also Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 1442–45 & nn.70–
71; Johnson & Millon, supra note 123, at 27–28.
236. See infra notes 246–250 and accompanying text.
237. See infra note 250.
238. See infra text accompanying note 250.
239. See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
240. The ultra vires doctrine held that activities that were not authorized by the corporate
charter were void as a matter of law. This meant that (1) third parties contracting with a
corporation on ultra vires matters could not enforce their contracts, and (2) that shareholders
could prevent ultra vires corporate acts despite a board vote to the contrary. The harsh
consequences for third parties led to the abolition of this first aspect of the doctrine. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 124 (2011). Shareholders may, however, continue to derivatively or directly
challenge charter violations. Id. § 124(2); Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Techs., Inc., 65 A.3d 618,
647–54 (Del. Ch. 2013). This Article does not propose altering this balance in the ultra vires
doctrine.
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permitted operations in pursuit of its strategic purpose—the ultimate
end of the corporation, of which shareholder wealth maximization is
the archetypical example.
Most corporate law statutes that authorize “any lawful purpose”
should be seen as referring to tactical purposes. 241 Although most
states’ statutes allowed the formation of corporations for any lawful
purpose since the early 1900s, 242 those statutes required each charter
to specify a given firm’s purposes in specific terms. 243 It was only much
later that states began allowing corporations to be chartered with
multi-purpose language authorizing the firms to pursue any lawful
purpose. Delaware, for example, amended its statute to include multipurpose language in 1967, before which formal purpose recitations
were required. 244 Its legislature presumably switched to the “any lawful
purpose” language to enable firms to make value-enhancing tactical
decisions, like taking advantage of synergies in expanding or adapting
to market conditions, without having to engage in the guessing game
of making “extensive recitals of all the conceivable types of business in
which the corporation could engage.” 245

Corporate “powers,” which resemble tactical purposes, were another basis for cabining a
firm’s activities. Courts applying the ultra vires doctrine often meshed the concepts. See infra
note 253.
241. This Article asserts that this is the proper way to view most corporation-law statutes,
including title 8, section 101(c) combined with section 102(a)(3) of the Delaware Code, DEL.
CODE. ANN. (Supp. 2015). See supra note 227; infra notes 242–244 and accompanying text.
Delaware, however, has recently complicated things by using “purpose” to refer, in the benefitcorporation context, to “one or more specific public benefits.” § 362(a)(1). That benefit
corporations, which must be formed to pursue multiple ends, were explicitly added to the
Delaware General Corporation Law as a separate entity type, suggests that general business
corporations cannot pursue any end chosen by managers at any given moment. Id. There would
be no need for a new entity type if traditional corporations could be formed to pursue any
combination of ends.
242. Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 249, 269 (1976).
243. E.g., 21 DEL. LAWS ch. 273, § 7 (1899).
244. EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., 1 FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION
LAW § 102.4 (5th ed. 2006). Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (Delaware’s current
statute allowing a certificate provision stating that “all lawful acts and activities shall be within
the purposes of the corporation”) with 21 DEL. LAWS ch. 273, § 7 (1899) (previous statute
requiring a certificate provision specifying “[t]he nature of the business or objects or purposes
proposed to be transacted, promoted or carried on.”).
245. WELCH ET AL., supra note 244, at § 102.4. Note that the commentator equates a
purpose with a type of business in which the firm may engage. TransUnion, for example, began
in
1968
as
a
railcar-leasing
company.
Company
History,
TRANSUNION,
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A few sample cases involving typical tactical purposes show that
“purpose,” as used in corporate charters and statutes, refers to
allowable firm operations. In People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, Perkins,
officer of an insurance company involved in the Great Wall Street
Scandal, challenged his criminal indictment for making a nearly
$50,000 political contribution from corporate funds. 246 Although split
on the criminality question, 247 and despite Perkins’ insistence that he
made the donation to promote policyholder interests and “had acted
in the honest belief that he was benefiting the company,” the court
unanimously agreed that the donation was ultra vires because not
authorized by its charter. 248 A company tactically purposed with
writing insurance, in other words, could not pursue its strategic
purpose—assumed to be serving stockholder interests 249—by making
campaign contributions. Had the charter authorized political activity,
the donation would presumably have been legitimate, as long as it was
made ultimately to benefit shareholders. 250
Brinson Ry. Co. v. Exchange Bank of Springfield, in holding that a
railroad corporation’s attempting to build a school in a town on its
line was ultra vires, succinctly stated the concept of tactical corporate
purpose by referring to the operations in which a corporation may
engage: “Every corporation must act according to its nature: a trading

http://www.transunion.com/corporate/about-transunion/who-we-are/companyhistory.page (last visited Sept. 8, 2016). It acquired a credit agency to complement some of its
technology investments. Id. Its railcar-leasing business subsequently declined, and it is now one
of the three primary credit-reporting firms. TransUnion is the subject of the famous case, Smith
v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
246. People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 80 N.E. 383, 383, 391 (N.Y. 1907); see supra text
accompanying notes 136–150.
247. New York’s high court ruled that criminal charges could not stand because the matter
was “private in its character and must be redressed by private suit.” Perkins, 80 N.E. at 386.
248. Id. at 386–87 (“The company had not the right, under the law of its existence, to
agree to make contributions for political campaigns, any more than to agree to do other things
foreign to its charter”); id. at 388 (Hiscock, J., concurring) (stating that the contribution “was
absolutely beyond the purposes for which that corporation existed”); see id. at 392 (Cullen, C.J.,
dissenting) (describing Perkins’s actions as both ultra vires and criminal).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 136–150.
250. Cf. SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 2819 (2d ed. 1909) (discussing the problems with ultra vires political
donations); People v. Gansley, 158 N.W. 195, 201 (Mich. 1916) (holding that a firm chartered
for the “purpose of manufacturing beer” could not make a $500 political contribution because
“[t]he privilege was not conferred upon it of using its funds for the purpose of influencing public
sentiment in connection with any election”).
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corporation must trade, a manufacturing corporation must
manufacture, a banking corporation must bank, a transportation
corporation must carry, etc.” 251
Not all courts were so restrictive. Virgil v. Virgil Practice Clavier
Co. and Steinway v. Steinway & Sons allowed firms chartered to make
and sell musical instruments to open music schools and donate pianos
to charity on the ground that they were directly related to the firms’
purposes. 252
These typical purposes were all tactical—they prescribed the
business operations in which the firms could engage while pursuing
their strategic purposes. 253 They were restrictive by nature. The 1967
“any lawful purpose” language lifted this restriction in firms that opted
into it. There is no reason to believe that in making it easier to engage
in any lawful operations, the Delaware legislature intended to arrogate
shareholder wealth maximization as the general business corporation’s
default (or mandatory254) strategic purpose. 255
Courts allow managers of firms chartered to conduct “any lawful
purpose” to pursue any lawful tactical purpose, including the interests
of nonshareholder constituencies or donating to political candidates,

251. Brinson Ry. Co. v. Exch. Bank of Springfield, 85 S.E. 634, 634–35 (Ga. 1915).
252. Virgil v. Virgil Prac. Clavier Co., 68 N.Y.S. 335, 335–36 (Sup. Ct. 1900)
(“[M]anufacturing corporation organized . . . for ‘the manufacture and sale of instruments
designed for practice and instruction in the art of playing the piano and other instruments having
a similar keyboard, and of any instrument, appliance, or thing which may be used for such
practice and instruction, whether independently or in connection with musical instruments or
with instruments designed for practice only.’”); Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S. 718,
718 (Sup. Ct. 1896) (“[T]he company was incorporated . . . for the purpose, as expressed in the
certificate of incorporation, of manufacturing and selling pianofortes and other musical
instruments.”). In Steinway, the plaintiff also challenged more obviously appropriate acts,
including the construction of a factory and employee facilities. Id. at 719.
253. Accord Yosifon, supra note 169, at 185 n.12. Tactical purposes were similar to
corporate powers, and courts often referred to them as such. See, e.g., Gansley, 158 N.W. at 200,
201 (referring to beer making as a “purpose”); Brinson, 85 S.E. at 634–35; Perkins, 80 N.E. at
422; Virgil, 68 N.Y.S. at 337; Steinway, 40 N.Y.S. at 720–22; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
122 (2011) (covering corporate powers).
254. See infra Section III.A.
255. Specially chartered corporations are not an automatic exception. As Professor Roberta
Romano notes, “[t]he chartering of corporations to provide public goods in an earlier era does
not indicate that the objective was not shareholder wealth maximization. The rate of return on
those investments was not fixed by the state, as it is today for public utilities.” Romano, supra
note 83, at 1602 n.10.
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provided that managers advance the shareholders’ strategic purpose.256
Corporate law, at base, is about curbing incentive problems via
fiduciary duties. Unfettered board discretion to alter a strategic
purpose in ways unauthorized by shareholders would be a classic
such problem.
Given that shareholders are properly assumed to retain the wealthmaximization stick from the corporate bundle, 257 and that statutes are
most fairly read to allow any lawful tactical purpose, shareholder
wealth maximization is and should be the default strategic purpose in
general corporations. 258 This rule fits best with the business and
investing community’s expectations. A contrary rule would be unfair
and disruptive. With this most natural corporate purpose established,
if a corporate charter clearly specifies that a corporation is to be
strategically run for a non–shareholder value end, courts should
enforce it. It is not a given, however, that corporate law allows such
flexibility, as discussed in the next Part.
III. FREEDOM OF CORPORATE PURPOSE
Although the law of corporate purpose has developed in a context
where shareholder interests have been synonymous with wealth, it is
easily adapted to nonpecuniary concerns. It is often said that
individuals will structure their relationships in a way that maximizes
their wealth. 259 It is better, however, to say that individuals order their
affairs to maximize their well-being. 260 As incomes rise, 261 it is natural
that individuals would shift from purely monetary gain to other,

256. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n 558 U.S. 310 (2010); supra Section
II.C. But see infra note 269 (discussing federal law).
257. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
258. A firm with charter limits on its tactical purpose would, of course, be limited to
engaging in its authorized business operations.
259. E.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1549, 1551 n.10 (1989).
260. F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM: TEXT AND DOCUMENTS 125–27 (Bruce
Caldwell ed. 2007) (1944); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Nature of Man, 7
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 4 (1994).
261. Chad Stone et al., A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, CTR.
ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, (July 29, 2016), http://www.cbpp.org/research/povertyand-inequality/a-guide-to-statistics-on-historical-trends-in-income-inequality.
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nonpecuniary preferences. 262 This Part builds on the shareholder
wealth maximization norm, proposing that shareholders be allowed to
order their affairs as they wish by selecting strategic and tactical
purposes of their choosing when they incorporate.
This Part first examines whether existing corporate law is
sufficiently enabling to permit diversity in corporate purpose.
Concluding that it can be without much alteration, the Article offers
an approach stressing stockholder choice. The Part then engages the
question of which strategic purposes should be cognizable. It
concludes by situating a regime allowing nonwealth purposes amidst
alternative off-the-rack corporate forms and addressing concerns
related to enforcing shareholder rights.
A. Is Corporate Law Sufficiently Enabling?
This section examines the distinct lack of clarity in whether the
common law of corporate purpose would recognize a chartered
nonstandard strategic purpose. It proposes that the doubt be resolved
in favor of allowing such purposes, subject to proper shareholder
notice. The section concludes with three case studies of firms
commonly understood to pursue non–shareholder wealth purposes.
1. Enforceability of nonstandard strategic purposes
At least one state chartering agency has been unwilling to accept
charters with nonstandard purposes. One California attorney working
with B Lab and another client in 2010 inquired with the California
Secretary of State about the validity under the California Corporations
Code of charters containing social purposes. 263 The Secretary’s office
replied only that it would interpret California’s “any lawful act”
provision literally. 264 He attempted to file a certificate of incorporation
containing the following nonwealth, social purpose on behalf of the
client:
Section 1. The purpose of the Corporation is to:

262. The preferences themselves need not change, but wealth has diminishing marginal
utility. As individuals become richer, they will naturally begin to demand more of what is not
tied directly to money.
263. Telephone Interview with R. Todd Johnson, Partner, Jones Day (Sept. 2, 2016).
264. Id.; CAL. CORP. CODE § 202(b) (West 2015).
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(a) Engage in any lawful act or activity for which a corporation may
be organized under the General Corporation Law of California other
than the banking business, the trust company business, or the
practice of a profession permitted to be incorporated by the
California Corporations Code; and
(b) Improve the health of young people by developing and/or
distributing innovative products and services that will increase
physical activity in young people. 265

The Secretary rejected several attempts. 266
That same attorney, representing the same client, sought from
several Delaware law firms an opinion letter stating that a charter
containing a distinctly nonwealth purpose would be enforceable.267
None would so opine. 268 That is, perhaps, not surprising given how
strongly Delaware case law implies that a chartered strategic purpose
other than shareholder wealth maximization would be
unenforceable. 269 In eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, for

265. E-mail from R. Todd Johnson, Partner, Jones Day, to author (Sept. 9, 2016 9:56 AM
CDT); [Anonymous], Certificate of Incorporation, June 2010 (on file with author) (The firm’s
name has been replaced with “Anonymous” to maintain confidentiality.). Although the parties
involved interpreted subsection (b) of this provision as a strategic purpose, under this Article’s
proposal, the charter would ideally make it clear that it intends to displace shareholder wealth,
rather than merely achieve shareholder wealth via operations that improve the health of young
people by selling innovative products. See infra Section III.A.2. The charter would also have to
be accompanied by extrinsic notice (which would not likely have been an issue for the proposed
corporation) to potential share purchasers that shareholder wealth is not the firm’s strategic
purpose. Id.
266. Telephone Interview with R. Todd Johnson, supra note 263; Letter from Theresa
Rea-Martinez, Staff Counsel, California Secretary of State Business Programs Division Legal
Review to [Anonymous] (June 14, 2010) (on file with author) (The recipient’s name has been
replaced with “Anonymous” to maintain confidentiality.).
267. Telephone Interview with R. Todd Johnson, supra note 263
268. Id.
269. As discussed, Delaware is the benchmark for corporate law. See supra note 122.
Interestingly, federal law after Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), comes
down fairly clearly, if implicitly, in support of allowing nonstandard charter provisions. See id. at
2770–71; see also Tyndale House Pubs., Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 116 (D.D.C.
2012). Professor Bainbridge maintains that Hobby Lobby applies strictly to close corporations.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Does Hobby Lobby sound a death knell for Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.?,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 3, 2014), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2014/07/does-hobby-lobby-sound-a-death-knell-for-dodge-v-fordmotor-co.html. Hobby Lobby’s reasoning, however, applies with equal force to public
corporations provided that mid-stream investors are aware of a given firm’s unusual purpose. In
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example, the Delaware Chancery Court addressed, in part, whether it
was acceptable that Craigslist “not be about the business of
stockholder wealth maximization.” 270 Craigslist’s charter employed
standard any-lawful-purpose language. 271 The court used strong
language to hold that two of Craigslist’s original stockholders, Jim and
Craig, who held a majority of the firm’s stock and controlled its board,
could not eschew shareholder wealth maximization against eBay’s
objection after eBay purchased 28.4 percent of the company from the
third original shareholder:
The corporate form . . . is not an appropriate vehicle for purely
philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders
interested in realizing a return on their investment. Jim and Craig
opted to form Craigslist, Inc. as a for-profit Delaware corporation and
voluntarily accepted millions of dollars from eBay as part of a
transaction whereby eBay became a stockholder. Having chosen a
for-profit corporate form, the Craigslist directors are bound by the
fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those
standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for
the benefit of its stockholders. The “Inc.” after the company name
has to mean at least that. 272

Unocal, which the eBay court applied, and other decisions by
Delaware courts employ nearly as strong language. 273 B Lab today
believes that a charter provision adopting a nonstandard purpose
would only be enforceable in a jurisdiction governed by a constituency
statute. 274

any event, corporate law is a state animal, making federal precedent merely persuasive in most
cases.
270. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
271. Craigslist, Inc., Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation, Jan. 2,
2008; see infra text accompanying note 302.
272. eBay, 16 A.3d 1 at 34. As this passage suggests, Jim and Craig were involved in the
transaction in which eBay acquired its interest. Id. at 10. eBay eventually sold its shares back to
Craigslist after years of litigation. Leena Rao, eBay sells a coveted prize back to Craigslist, ending
long legal tussle, FORTUNE (June 19, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/06/19/ebay-craigslist
-stake-buy/.
273. Id. at 31–35; supra notes 188–189 and accompanying text; see supra Section II.C.
274. See Corporation Legal Roadmap, supra note 216. B Lab looked into filing charters
with nonstandard purposes in California and Delaware in 2010 because those states did not have
constituency statutes. See supra text accompanying notes 263–268. That experience informs its
current view.
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Yet most decisional language, although clearly referring to
shareholder wealth when viewed in context, leaves room for
nonstandard strategic purposes in referring to the “best interests of the
corporation’s stockholders” and the “benefit of its shareholder
owners.” 275 And shareholders’ knowing, affirmative, and voluntary
waiver of the right to wealth maximization would not subject them to
injustice as would a default plenary-board-power rule. 276 The
American Law Institute agrees, but acknowledges that little law exists
on
the
enforceability
of
nonstandard-strategic-purpose
charter provisions. 277
Former Chancellor William B. Chandler III of the Delaware
Court of Chancery expressed doubt about changing the fundamental
nature of fiduciary duties, charter provisions to the contrary
notwithstanding, in a recent lecture. 278 Other commenting jurists have
their doubts, but appear cautiously open to the possibility that
corporations might validly be chartered to pursue nonstandard ends.
Vice Chancellor Laster, while stating that wealth maximization is the
“universal . . . standard of [directorial] conduct,” expressed
uncertainty about the rule’s mandatory nature: “the principle that
corporations must be operated for the benefit of the common
stockholders is likely itself a default rule that the parties to the
corporate contract can modify.” 279 Justice Leo Strine, Jr., appears to
view non–shareholder wealth strategic purposes as conceivable, even
noble, but unsustainable. 280
Professor Bainbridge appears to share the jurists’ ambivalence,
although he seems to have become more receptive to nonwealth
strategic purposes. In 1992, he wrote that “state law arguably does
not permit corporate organic documents to redefine the directors’
fiduciary duties” because shareholder wealth maximization was well

275. See supra notes 188–189 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
276. See supra text surrounding notes 234–235.
277. 1 AM. LAW INST., 1-2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 reporter’s n.6 [hereinafter ALI REPORT].
278. William B. Chandler III, Presentation at the 8th Annual Berle Symposium: Benefit
Corporations and the Firm Commitment Universe (June 28, 2016), https://law.seattleu.edu/
centers-and-institutes/berle-center/symposium/berle-viii.
279. Laster, supra note 168, at 25, 28 n.115 (emphasis added).
280. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 149–50 & nn.44–45, 154–55 (2012).
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settled. 281 In 2010, referring to ice cream maker Ben & Jerry’s social
mission, he wrote: “As a contractarian, . . . if Ben & Jerry went public
with a [corporate social responsibility] provision in their articles, I’d
have no objection.” 282 More recently, in discussing Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby, he referred to shareholder wealth maximization as a mere
default rule. 283
Other academics seem to take for granted the validity of provisions
orienting a firm toward non–shareholder wealth ends. Professor
Jonathan R. Macey views their enforceability as a consequence of the
contractarian aspect of corporations. 284 Professors Easterbrook and
Fischel agree, with a more normative undercurrent stressing
constituent freedom. 285
This Article adopts the Macey-Easterbrook-Fischel view as part of
its theoretical underpinning. It adds its view of the corporation as a
historical bundle of sticks, of which shareholders retain the right to
determine corporate ends, and an associational entity through which
shareholders pursue their goals. But a charter provision opting out of
shareholder value may not meet the demands of public policy given
that most shareholders invest for profit in an environment where they
have little control and believe that managers have a duty to try to
maximize their wealth. 286 Sufficient notice to mid-stream stockholders
answers this concern.
2. Notice
The success of a corporate-law system accommodating strategic
purposes other than shareholder wealth maximization requires

281. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 985.
282. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Does eBay spell doom for corporate social
responsibility?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Dec 6, 2010), http://www.professorbainbridge.
com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/12/does-ebay-spell-doom-for-corproate-socialresponsibility.html.
283. Bainbridge, supra note 269.
284. Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to
Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266,
1268–69 (1999).
285. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 36.
286. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 117–18 (Del. 1952) (stating
that shareholders may alter a common-law rule only if they avoid “a result forbidden by settled
rules of public policy”).
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predictability by and fairness to shareholders. 287 This subsection
proposes notice requirements that would alleviate prejudice to
shareholders, and then applies it in three case studies.
a. Form of notice. In accord with the view of a corporation as a
placeholder for stockholder rights, corporate law already allows
shareholders to run their firms for any strategic purpose if they are
unanimous in their wishes. 288 There is no reason that later-stage,
diffusely held firms cannot inherit and be managed to pursue
nonstandard ends. Nonstandard purposes should be accepted as
legitimate provided that mid-stream shareholders are put on notice via
the firm’s organic documents, other sources, or both, of the
nonstandard terms of the corporate bargains into which they enter. 289
Given the corporate charter’s fundamental role in setting the
terms of the corporate contract, inclusion therein of a nonstandard
strategic purpose should be a necessary condition of validity. 290 The
articles of incorporation would have to clearly distinguish the
corporation’s strategic and tactical purposes. 291 But a charter provision
is likely to put on notice only those with the know-how and resources
to obtain corporate charters. Even in the Internet age, obtaining a
charter copy from most state chartering agencies can be a complex
matter, often involving the payment of nontrivial fees and waiting for
287. It is worth considering whether nonshareholder constituencies should also be noticed
in situations where a corporation’s nonstandard strategic purpose is intertwined with its tactical
one to the extent that it impacts the firm’s income, and by extension its ability to meet other
contractual obligations. This potential topic of future work relates to the residual risk-bearing
issue mentioned in note 189, supra. This Article assumes that nonshareholders are responsible
for investigating their counterparties’ financial conditions, as in any other contracting situation
involving corporations.
288. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (2011); 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 5/7.70–7.71 (West
2015); see also eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010); Clark
v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641, 642 (1936) (holding enforceable a unanimous shareholder agreement
restricting the board’s managerial authority); ALI REPORT, supra note 277, § 2.01 reporter’s
n.6; Bainbridge, supra note 269.
289. This would bind stockholders who dissented from a firm’s nonwealth end, eliminating
the need for the unanimity otherwise required to pursue a nonwealth purpose. In Craigslist’s
case, the dissenting shareholder broke unanimity, and won. See supra text accompanying notes
270, 288; infra note 303 and accompanying text.
290. The charter may also specify a mechanism for shareholders to change their
strategic purpose.
291. It might use this Article’s nomenclature, referring to the “tactical purpose” and
“strategic purpose,” or other language indicating the operations in which the corporation may
engage and the ends which those operations are intended to promote.
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a hard copy of the charter to arrive in the mail. 292 Public corporations
must include their charters in their 10-Q and 10-K filings mandated
by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Although these filings are
publicly available, finding them via the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s EDGAR online database is cumbersome. The filings are
more easily searched using third-party databases, 293 but these carry
high subscription fees. The difficulty and costs involved in obtaining
charters, although not serious impediments for institutional
investors, 294 would substantially inhibit notice via charter for the
individual holders of roughly half of U.S. equities. 295
Until, or for a modest period after, it becomes easier for lay
investors to obtain corporate charters, additional public dissemination
of a firm’s nonstandard purpose should be required to deem notice
sufficient. 296 Notice may consist of the firm’s public behavior, a

292. For example, the author’s research involved obtaining charters from a number of
states, including Connecticut, Delaware, Vermont, and Pennsylvania. Obtaining Newman’s
Own Inc.’s articles of incorporation from Connecticut involved searching for the entity online,
sending the state a paper check for $40, and waiting for the documents to arrive in the mail
about 10 days later. Retrieving Craigslist’s corporate documents from Delaware required
searching for the entity online, paying a $20 fee by credit card to see more detailed company
information and a filing history, going to a different web page and paying another $36 for the
documents, and them waiting for them to arrive in the mail. Getting Ben & Jerry’s articles of
association from Vermont required searching for the business online, filling out a web form,
writing out a paragraph of text describing the requested documents, and waiting for the
documents to arrive via e-mail a few days later. Retrieving Conestoga Woods’ corporate
documents from Pennsylvania involved searching for the entity online, paying a $15 fee ($3
each) for the documents, and downloading them immediately.
293. E.g., Company Filings, INTELLIGIZE, http://www.intelligize.com/products/compa
ny-filings/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2016).
294. See Gordon, supra note 259, at 1562–63 (discussing investor attention to charter
provisions in a context suggesting that the investors are sophisticated). Institutional investors
and others who have easy access to charters may be considered to be on inquiry notice.
295. MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT
REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION 22 (2010) (showing
that institutions owned 50.6 percent of outstanding U.S. equity in 2009); see also ALI REPORT,
supra note 277, § 2.01 reporter’s n.6 (“[T]he mere fact that [a public corporation] has a
restriction of this nature in its certificate of incorporation may not be sufficient to make a
restriction on the profit motive effective if few shareholders are actually aware of the provision.”).
296. In states like Vermont or Pennsylvania, where shareholders can readily obtain charter
copies online at little or no cost, see supra note 292, charter notice may be enough now, or in
the very near future when knowledge of the existence of general corporations with nonstandard
strategic purposes becomes widespread enough to put potential share purchasers on inquiry
notice of the need to examine the charters before making equity investments. One might,
perhaps, eventually also deem nonchartered public notice sufficient. See George A. Mocsary,
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conspicuously posted mission statement, 297 private certifications of a
firm’s nonstandard strategic purpose like those offered by B Lab, 298 or
perhaps conspicuous posting of its charter on its website. 299
b. Case studies. It is instructive to apply the suggested notice
requirements to a few firms commonly understood to pursue
nonstandard strategic purposes, perhaps alongside a wealthgeneration end.
(1) Craigslist. Craigslist, the famous classified site which gives
away most of its advertisements, was founded in 1995 and initially
incorporated in California in 1999 as 1010 Cole Street. 300 In 2004 it
merged into Craigslist, Inc., a Delaware corporation. 301 Craigslist’s
initial and two subsequent charters included a generic purpose: “The
purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for
which corporations may be organized under the General Corporation
Law of Delaware.” 302 Under both current law and this Article’s
proposal, eBay’s desire to run the firm for profit destroyed the
unanimity required to operate a firm chartered with such a generic
purpose for ends other than shareholder wealth maximization. 303 Had
Shareholder Wealth Maximization: A Response to Cynthia Williams, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Feb.
20, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/shareholder-wealth-maximization-aresponse-to-cynthia-williams.
297. Cf. About Seventh Generation, SEVENTH GENERATION,
http://www.seventhgeneration.com/about-seventh-generation (last visited Sept. 8, 2016).
298. See supra text accompanying note 216. Professor J. Haskell Murray discusses benefits
and drawbacks of private branding in Murray, supra note 185, at 44–46.
299. Some corporations make their charters available online. It is not a ubiquitous practice:
of 19 corporations randomly chosen by the author’s research assistants (Apple, Ben & Jerrys,
Best Buy, BIC, Caterpillar, Clorox, Ford, John Deere, Kroger, Nestle, Nike, McDonald’s,
Purina, Starbucks, Target, Under Armour, Verizon, Vizio, and Walmart), only nine (Apple, Best
Buy, Caterpillar, McDonald’s, Nestle, Starbucks, Target, Under Armour, and Verizon) posted
their charters.
300. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 8 (Del. Ch. 2010); CAL. SEC’Y
OF STATE, Business Search, http://kepler.sos.ca.gov/ (search for “1010 Cole Street”).
301. Certificate of Merger of 1010 Cole Street, Inc., a California Corporation, into
Craigslist, Inc., A Delaware Corporation, Oct. 22. 2004.
302. Craigslist, Inc., Certificate of Incorporation, Oct. 13, 2004; Craigslist, Inc., Amended
and Restated Certificate of Incorporation, Apr. 25, 2005; Craigslist, Inc., Second Amended and
Restated Certificate of Incorporation, Jan. 2, 2008.
303. See supra notes 241–245, 261, 269–272, 288 and accompanying text. One might
argue that eBay must have known Craigslist’s social mission, and should therefore have been
held to it. See also Johnson & Millon, supra note 123, at 12; supra note 296. Yet it is equally
true, as Chancellor Chandler noted, that Jim and Craig, who were well represented, knew or

1376

2.MOCSARY.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1319

10/1/16 12:31 PM

Freedom of Corporate Purpose

Craigslist’s charter stated, for example, that “The purpose of the
corporation is to provide free online classified advertisements as a
service to the public. In doing so, it may engage in any lawful
operations, including charging for some classified advertisements,” its
mission would have been secure.
(2) Ben & Jerry’s. Ice cream maker Ben & Jerry’s was
incorporated in 1977 by its two eponymous founders, and began its
well-known social mission in earnest in 1982. 304 The company publicly
offered stock to Vermont residents in 1984 and went fully public the
following year, all while expanding its social mission. 305 As its social
works expanded, so did the company’s reputation and sales. 306 Its
“double bottom line” may have helped it succeed; it may also have
contributed to its decline. 307 Takeover offers began in the late 1990s,
and in 2000 the company’s board accepted Unilever’s bid. 308 Reports
soon spread that the board sold because it had no choice but to
maximize shareholder wealth. 309
Ben & Jerry’s chartered purpose at the time of its sale was:
To engage in the production, manufacture, and distribution, at both
wholesale and retail, of ice cream, ice cream novelties, ices, crepes,
together with other food and beverages, alcoholic and non alcoholic.
To carry on any other lawful business whatsoever in connection with
any of the foregoing or which is calculated directly or indirectly to

should have known that eBay would seek to have Craigslist run to maximize shareholder wealth
and that this would break the unanimity required to do otherwise. See supra notes 272, 288 and
accompanying text. They nonetheless accepted millions of dollars as part of eBay’s acquisition.
eBay, 16 A.3d at 6, 11.
304. Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the
Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 216–17 (2010).
305. Id. at 218–19.
306. Id. at 218–24.
307. Id. at 224–25, 226–27 (discussing consumers’ views of the company as “a force for
good”); Joshua Fershee, The Wake of the eBay Decision: Is Ben & Jerry’s
Next?, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Dec. 6, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/
2010/12/the-wake-of-the-ebay-decision-is-ben-jerrys-next-.html.
308. Page & Katz, supra note 304, at 225–26.
309. Id. at 212–13; 228–29.
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promote the interests of the Corporation, or to in any way enhance
the value of the Corporation. 310

This statement both affirmed the pursuit of value and contained rather
standard purpose language. It thus would not have supported a
nonstandard strategic purpose. This is not to say, of course, that the
company’s board may not easily have gotten away with declining a
value-maximizing sale contrary to its fiduciary duties. 311 The point is
that the corporation’s charter explicitly required wealth maximization.
Interestingly, the charter was amended on August 3, 2000, when
Unilever’s acquisition was finalized. 312 Although the new charter
included a standard purpose, 313 it also adopted a lengthy
mission statement:
We have a progressive, nonpartisan social mission that seeks to meet
human needs and eliminate injustices in our local, national and
international communities by integrating these concerns into our
day-to-day business activities. Our focus is on children and families,
the environment, and sustainable agriculture on family farms.
• Capitalism and the wealth it produces does not create
opportunity for everyone equally. We recognize that the gap
between the rich and the poor is wider than at anytime since the
1920s. We strive to create economic opportunities for those who
have been denied them and to advance new models of economic
justice that are sustainable and replicable.
• By definition, manufacturing creates waste. We strive to minimize
our negative impact on the environment.
• The growing of food is overly reliant on the use of toxic chemicals
and other methods that are unsustainable. We support sustainable
and safe methods of food production that reduce environmental

310. Ben and Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., Articles of Association, Dec. 16, 1977. This purpose
did not change through six charter amendments.
311. Page & Katz, supra note 304, at 233–42; see supra notes 185–186 and accompanying
text. The board could easily have pointed to its prosocial activities as having been integral to the
company’s success, and to assert that, in its judgment, continuing those activities as an
independent firm was in the shareholders’ best interest.
312. Our History, BEN & JERRY’S, http://www.benjerry.com/about-us#4timeline (last
visited Sept. 8, 2016).
313. Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation,
Aug. 3, 2000 (“The purpose of the Corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for
which corporations may be organized under the Vermont Business Corporation Act.”).
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degradation, maintain the productivity of the land over time, and
support the economic viability of family farms and rural
communities.

• We seek and support nonviolent ways to achieve peace and justice.
We believe government resources are more productively used in
meeting human needs than in building and maintaining weapons
systems.
• We strive to show a deep respect for human beings inside and
outside our company and for the communities in which
they live. 314

On the one hand, a mission statement can be seen as inherently
constituting a strategic purpose, coupled with a standard purpose
statement best seen as referring only to operations. 315 On the other,
the statement refers to integrating this mission into its business
operations, suggesting that its mission applies only insofar as it can
lead to greater wealth creation (as it has for much of the company’s
life). Given the public nature of Ben & Jerry’s mission, Unilever’s
commitment to that mission, and the company’s having obtained B
Lab certification in 2012, 316 it is safe to assume that, should Unilever
decide to sell some of its interest in Ben & Jerry’s, buyers would have
reason to know of the firm’s nonstandard purpose. 317
(3) Hobby Lobby. Hobby Lobby started as an arts-and-crafts
store that eventually incorporated in 1977. 318 Its certificate of
incorporation includes a seventeen-paragraph purpose statement that
is essentially an “extensive recital[] of all the conceivable types of
business in which the corporation could engage” 319 that also includes
language authorizing the pursuit of “any . . . lawful business . . .
calculated directly or indirectly to promote the interest of the

314. Id.
315. See supra Section II.E.2; note 313.
316. Ben & Jerry’s, BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.net/community/
ben-and-jerrys (last visited Sept. 8, 2016).
317. As long as Unilever wholly owns Ben & Jerry’s, it can run its subsidiary as it pleases,
including enhancing its reputation in pursuit of wealth.
318. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765 (2014); Hobby Lobby,
Inc., Certificate of Incorporation, Nov. 28, 1977.
319. See Welch, supra note 245, § 102.4; supra note 245 and accompanying text.
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Corporation or to enhance the value of its property.” 320 The charter
does not include reference to the Green family owners’ well-known
Christian mission. 321 Despite the absence of a chartered nonstandard
purpose, Hobby Lobby has publicized a statement of
Christian purpose:
In order to effectively serve our owners, employees, and customers
the Board of Directors is committed to:
Honoring the Lord in all we do by operating the company in a
manner consistent with Biblical principles.
Offering our customers an exceptional selection and value.
Serving our employees and their families by establishing a work
environment and company policies that build character,
strengthen individuals, and nurture families.
Providing a return on the owners’ investment, sharing the
Lord’s blessings with our employees, and investing in
our community.
We believe that it is by God’s grace and provision that Hobby
Lobby has endured. He has been faithful in the past, and we
trust Him for our future. 322

Hobby Lobby’s owners have been able to run the corporation in
accord with these non-wealth-maximizing principles because they,
unanimous in their wishes, executed a shareholder agreement to do
so. 323 Were it not for that unanimity and subsequent agreement (which
is now binding even if a shareholder changes his or her mind), the

320. Hobby Lobby, Inc., Certificate, supra note 318, at 4.
321. For example, Hobby Lobby stores are closed on Sunday despite a resulting reduction
in profits. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2766.
322. This purpose was posted on Hobby Lobby’s website from at least October 2, 2009,
through April 14, 2015, which covers the period at issue in Burwell. Statement of
Purpose, HOBBY LOBBY, http://web.archive.org/web/20150501000000*/http://hobbylob
by.com/our_company/purpose.cfm (click on the years and dates within the years in which the
site indicates that a snapshot was taken). The current version contains the same text, reordered,
and is no longer called a purpose. Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/
about-us/our-story (last visited Sept. 8, 2016).
323. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2766; see supra note 288 and accompanying text.
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Greens would not, for at least the medium term, 324 be able to run
Hobby Lobby to pursue nonwealth ends in the face of a dissenting
stockholder.
B. Valid Strategic Purposes
It remains to determine which strategic purposes the law should
recognize. A starting point is any strategic purpose that has potential
to create net positive externalities. 325 A starting assumption, in turn, is
that any otherwise legal act may constitute a cognizable strategic
purpose. But corporations “exist[] by grace of the law that called
[them] into being.” 326 Legislatures certainly, and courts via the
common law, could limit the strategic (and tactical) purposes for
which corporations are formed.
Potential strategic purposes may be grouped into four categories:
•
•
•
•

the pursuit of shareholder wealth, via any operations;
the pursuit of another corporate or outside constituency’s
wealth or nonwealth interests, via any operations;
the pursuit of a public benefit, where the strategic and tactical
purposes coincide;
the pursuit of a nonwealth private benefit for a firm
constituency,
where
the
strategic
and
tactical
purposes coincide.

A combination of these is also possible. 327 Each creates first-order
private benefits, public benefits, or both; all create significant second-

324. See supra note 296 and accompanying text. Once the structure proposed herein
becomes well accepted, a nonchartered purpose declaration may be deemed enough in some
circumstances. Id.
325. What constitutes a positive externality may be difficult to define. As J. William Callison
says, “One man’s global warming is another’s agricultural crop enhancement—who is to say
where ‘public benefit’ definitively lies?” Callison, supra note 100, at 104. As discussed supra
Section I.B.2.b, states have many social-benefit-creating reasons for chartering corporations.
These benefits are a necessary part of the externality calculus.
326. Peer Zumbansen, The New Embeddedness of the Corporation: Corporate Social
Responsibility in the Knowledge Society, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 119, 140 (Cynthia A. Williams & Peer Zumbansen
eds., 2011).
327. For a discussion of the multiple-masters problem potentially created by chartering a
firm to pursue multiple strategic purposes, see infra Section III.C.1.
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order public benefits. 328 They are all, in essence, types of moralities.329
To limit the exercise of either—pecuniary or otherwise—via the
corporate form is effectively to disadvantage it in the marketplaces of
commerce and ideas. 330 Given that with proper notice, “the promoters
of the firm bear all the agency costs associated with the firm’s
governance arrangements,” 331 all should be acceptable corporate ends.
This section considers some nuances of each type of strategic purpose.
1. Long-term shareholder wealth maximization
[F]or most of the twentieth century, public companies drove the
U.S. economy, producing innovative products for consumers,
attractive employment opportunities for workers, tax revenues for
governments, and impressive investment returns for shareholders
and other investors. Corporations were the beating heart of a
thriving economic system that served both shareholders
and America. 332

And it all happened under the centuries-old societal understanding
that shareholder wealth maximization was the corporate norm.333
“That rule has helped produce an economy that is dominated by
public corporations, which in turn has produced the highest standard
of living of any society in the history of the world.” 334
But what sort of shareholder wealth maximization? Maximizing
long-term value, within the bounds of the law is per se proper.335
Successful long-term planning to improve and develop the firm’s
products and services will translate into sustainably increased future
cash flows. 336 It is axiomatic that, say, a car company that invests in
328. Determining what constitutes a benefit may be a difficult task. See supra note 325.
This Article attempts partly to address this question by distinguishing between first- and secondorder benefits. A first-order benefit is connected to a firm’s tactical and strategic purposes, like
providing free classified ads. A second-order benefit results collaterally from firm operations, like
the generation of tax revenues. See supra Section I.B.2.b.
329. Or lack thereof, some might say.
330. By way of example, both churches and abortion clinics incorporate.
331. Gordon, supra note 259, at 1556; see supra Section III.A.2.
332. STOUT, supra note 1, at 10; accord id. at 103–04; supra Section I.B.2.b.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 2–10; Sections II.A.1, II.C; Bainbridge, SWM
Norm, supra note 1, at 1423–24 & nn.2 & 3.
334. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 1446.
335. See supra Section II.C.1.
336. No business venture is, of course, ever sure to be successful.
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research and development to build ever-better cars will benefit all its
constituents in the long term: Customers happier with their cars will
buy them in the future and tell their friends to do the same. Robust
sales require more production, securing employees’ jobs and raises,
wealthier suppliers, more secure creditors, and communities with
greater employment opportunities and tax bases. The long-run benefit
to the shareholder residual claimants is clear: A company with greater
and more stable cash flows pays greater and more reliable dividends. 337
In markets functioning somewhat properly, some future cash flow will
be capitalized into current share price. 338
The firm’s success results in general good—as President John F.
Kennedy famously said, “A rising tide lifts all boats.” 339 Indeed, the
stockholder wealth created by public companies—with respect to
which the concerns relating to wealth-maximizing behavior are most
keen 340—is being shared by blue- and white-collar employees of nearly
every income level. Pension funds have demonstrated their ability and
willingness to share in corporate profits and influence firm behavior
through their massive stock holdings, 341 and “39% of companies make

337. Contrary to conventional discourse, shareholder value need not manifest itself in share
price. Dividends are a perfectly acceptable way to enhance shareholder wealth, and may reduce
the potential for managerial short-termism and other abuse by limiting managers’ access to
capital. See supra note 130; Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance,
and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986).
338. See supra notes 113, 201.
339. President Kennedy’s entire statement parallels the idea that one firm’s success has
significant positive externalities: “A rising tide lifts all the boats and as Arkansas becomes more
prosperous so does the United States and as this section declines so does the United States. So
I regard this as an investment by the people of the United States in the United States.” President
John F. Kennedy, Remarks in Heber Springs, Arkansas, at the Dedication of Greers Ferry Dam
(Oct. 13, 1963) (transcript available at THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9455 (last visited Sept. 8, 2016)); see also
Sharfman, supra note 14, at 393 & n.18. But see Bainbridge, SWM Norm, supra note 1, at 1439
n.57 (noting that where shareholders prefer increased risk, other constituencies may not benefit
from shareholder centricity). This is likely priced into contracts with the firm where, for example,
employment is typically at will.
340. It is in public corporations that ownership is most separated from control,
exacerbating the agency-cost problem. See supra Section I.B.1.e.
341. See, e.g., Simon Archer, Pension Funds as Owners and as Financial Intermediaries: A
Review of Recent Canadian Experience, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM, supra note 326, at 177, 177–204; Sanford M. Jacoby, Labor
and finance in the United States, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR,
AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 277, 304–09; see also Sanford M. Jacoby, Employee Representation
and Corporate Governance: A Missing Link, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 449, 452 (2001); Jeffrey
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their non-exempt employees eligible to receive some kind of stock
option or stock appreciation right.” 342 Further, roughly half of U.S.
equities are held by individual investors, and fifty-five percent of
people self-report owning stocks individually, via mutual fund, or in a
self-directed retirement account. 343 Public companies are, by
definition, open for investment by all. 344 The constituencies most often
cited as needing protection from the shareholder wealth maximization
norm are well positioned to benefit from long-term value creation.
There is no need to “break the power of the shareholder wealth
maximization norm.” 345 As Professor Stout says, “To build enduring
value, managers must focus on the long term as well as tomorrow’s
stock quotes, and must sometimes make credible if informal
commitments to customers, suppliers, employees, and other
stakeholders whose specific investments contribute to the firm’s
success.” 346 Of course. This is the shareholder wealth maximization
that is the law. 347 And because wealth maximization is the most
versatile stick in the corporate bundle, 348 others may benefit as well:
Cash in hand allows shareholders to donate directly to the causes of
their choosing, without self-interested management intermediaries
deciding which of their favored causes to support. 349

H. Birnbaum, Lobby’s Co-CEO Quit After Probe; Green Issued Loans Without Authorization,
WASH. POST, May 17, 2007, at D1 (reporting that labor is the biggest donor to candidates for
federal offices). Labor, indeed, needs wealth maximization to support its defined contribution
plans. Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON HALL
L. REV. 909, 911–12 (2013). Pensioner value is a pension fund’s raison d’etre—its strategic
purpose.
342. Corey Rosen, Equity Compensation: Who Gets What?, NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP
(Apr. 2012), https://www.nceo.org/articles/equity-compensation-who-gets- what.
343. Justin McCarthy, Little Change in Percentage of Americans Who Own Stocks, GALLUP
(Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/182816/little-change-percentage-americansinvested-market.aspx.
344. Cf. VERA C. SMITH, THE RATIONALE OF CENTRAL BANKING AND THE FREE
BANKING ALTERNATIVE 89 (1936) (“[B]efore the advent of the joint stock company [banking]
firms had always consisted of a large number of known and wealthy men.”).
345. Murray, supra note 185, at 26.
346. STOUT, supra note 1, at 110–11 (emphasis added).
347. See supra Sections II.B–C; supra text accompanying and following note 226; see also
supra text accompanying notes 37–38, 90.
348. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
349. It is well known that large corporations are more likely to donate to operas and
museums than soup kitchens and local schools.
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The norm is nevertheless often equated with maximizing shortterm stock price. 350 This is understandable in a world (1) dominated
by short-term incentive compensation based on share price, 351 (2)
empowered managers who are most familiar with the firms under their
charge and thus best positioned to extract wealth from them, 352 (3) of
whom “80 percent . . . report [that] they would sacrifice future
economic value to manage short-term earnings so as to meet investor
expectations,” 353 and (4) a business judgment rule that provides
managers cover for all but their most obviously self-serving actions.354
The same holds for politically and legally empowered shareholders
willing to use their power, via loyal managers, to their short-term
benefit. 355
Aside from the incentive for fraud, theft, and manipulation that
short-termism creates, 356 it can easily skew incentives toward otherwise
legitimate-appearing, but value-destroying, activities. It should not be
a surprise, for example, that managers compensated on short-term
results would prefer putting the firm’s cash into a bank account or far
riskier positions if doing so would yield greater short-term returns
than research and development, which by its nature is a long-term
investment.
Scholarship disagreeing about whether and over which time
horizons corporations pursue shareholder wealth abounds. 357 It is
350. E.g., STOUT, supra note 1, passim; Williams, supra note 155.
351. STOUT, supra note 1, at 20, 53, 71, 104–06 (discussing also legal provisions,
including those in the tax code, that incent short-term compensation packages); Mocsary, supra
note 113, at 131.
352. Winkler, supra note 64, at 911 (noting managers’ “secrecy, skill and evasive . . .
methods); COOK, supra note 101, § 643; see supra text accompanying and following note 3.
These sources show that this problem is not new.
353. Keith L. Johnson & Frank Jan De Graaf, Modernizing Pension Fund Legal Standards
for the Twenty-First Century, in WILLIAMS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 326, at 459, 464.
354. See supra notes 184–186 and accompanying text; see also supra Section II.B.
355. See STOUT, supra note 1, at 52, 112 (discussing proxy-access and other federal
regulations making it easier for large shareholders to influence management); Mocsary, supra
note 113, at 126 (discussing loose distribution rules), 131. Pension funds often fall into this
category. See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
356. These were perpetrated by Enron management in enormous scale and scope against
just about every imaginable internal and external constituency. See generally, BETHANY MCLEAN
& PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS
FALL OF ENRON (reprint ed. 2013).
357. Compare, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth
of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97 (2010), and Bernard S. Sharfman, A Theory
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clear, however, that cover for, and incentives to engage in, long-termvalue-destroying activities are present. 358 The pursuit of short-run
wealth is nevertheless appropriate in the special situations where the
long- and short-term are one, like at the Revlon moment, 359 or for
“companies formed to achieve some specific, short-run objective,”360
like the development of a leased oil field, where the value of the lease
declines markedly over its term. 361 The short-term nature of such
corporations’ purpose should be especially well noticed.
Notwithstanding money’s versatility, 362 some shareholders may
desire to sacrifice financial returns to achieve other objectives.
2. Pursuing nonshareholder constituency interests
A firm might be chartered to pursue the interests of a beneficiary
other than its shareholders. The beneficiary may be one with
substantial connections with the firm, like the firm’s employees,
customers, or community. It may be one not part of the corporate
team, 363 like a specified cause or charity. 364
The benefit may be pecuniary, in which case the firm’s free cash
flow not needed to sustain the company in the long term would be
paid to the employees as salary, customers as rebates, or its locality or
a charity as a donation or a sort-of dividend. It may involve

of Shareholder Activism and its Place in Corporate Law, 82 TENN. L. REV. 791 (2014–2015),
with Simon Deakin, Corporate governance and financial crisis in the long run, in WILLIAMS &
ZUMBANSEN, supra note 326, at 15, and Jarrad Harford et al., Do Long-Term Investors
Improve Corporate Decision Making? (July 2, 2016) (Finance Down Under 2015 and Asian
Finance Association 2015 conference paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2505261.
358. It may be that some measure of managerial short-termism is part of a closer-tooptimal equilibrium than could be realized under a legal rule other than the BJR. See supra notes
185–186 and accompanying text.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 199–203.
360. Robert N. Anthony, The Trouble with Profit Maximization, 38 HARV. BUS. REV. 126,
127 (1960).
361. The lessor would presumably price into the lease the value of this short-term use, and
positive law (hopefully) exists to prevent pollution and the like. Oil workers’ pay should likewise
price the term of employment.
362. See supra note 82 and accompanying and following text.
363. See supra text accompanying note 34.
364. More complex analogs that serve these interests exist: corporations can be employeeowned and employees can benefit from profit-sharing arrangements; mutual companies are
owned by their customers; municipal corporations engage in profit-making activities; and
nonprofits serve many causes. These suggest that true freedom of corporate purpose is feasible.
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guaranteeing job security to the extent possible, providing free
product to customers, building up a community’s infrastructure, or
directly serving a charity’s beneficiaries.
While the firm is profitable, it makes the specified constituency
look more like the corporation’s residual claimant while the
stockholders join those whose rights—if they retain any—are fixed by
contract. The founders presumably formed the corporation from a
desire to serve its chartered end, and may retain the rights to vote for
directors and to sue them derivatively. They may, however, decide to
grant this right to the beneficiary or a third party. When the firm is
losing money, however, the stockholders may need to infuse more
equity into the firm to keep it going.
3. Pursuing a publicly beneficial tactical purpose
Corporate founders may form a firm strategically purposed to
engage in certain tactical purposes365 that provide first-order benefits
to the public. The purpose may be humanitarian, like operating a
health-care facility; environmental, like providing free pollution
cleanup; religious, providing a place of worship to all comers; or
focused on providing a specific service, like giving away classified ads,
as does Craigslist, 366 or providing train service, as does Amtrak.
Amtrak, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, was
incorporated by Congress under the District of Columbia Business
Corporation Act. 367 It is subject to that Act unless federal law provides
otherwise. 368 It was formed—its strategic purpose is—to serve “public
convenience and necessity” by providing rail service and meeting
other national transportation goals. 369 Although it must “be operated
and managed as a for-profit corporation,” 370 it has received perpetual

365. Some business people may think of this as a “stractical purpose.” See, e.g., Jack S.
Duggal, Next Level Up: Are You a “Stractical” Project Manager?, PROJECT MGMT. INST. (Dec.
2009),
https://pmi-ctt.org/index.php/resources/newsletter/2007-2009/doc_download/
15-issue-44-december-2009. This Article declines to adopt this amorphous term.
366. See supra Section III.A.2.b.i.
367. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 385 (1995).
368. Its charter is thus effectively the document filed with the District, as superseded
by statute.
369. 49 U.S.C. §§ 24101, 24307 (2012 & Supp. 2015); Lebron, 513 U.S. at 383–84.
370. 49 U.S.C. § 24301(a)(2) (2012).
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subsidies. 371 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, despite contrary
Congressional intent, Amtrak is not a private corporation because it is
government controlled, 372 but there is no reason that private
stockholders could not create such an entity. 373
A continuing entity, whether a general business corporation or
nonprofit, needs capital to continue operating. The capital may come
from profitable operations, as in Craigslist’s case, or from cash
infusions by the owners, as in Amtrak’s case. Both are acceptable in
the case of properly informed private stockholders. 374
4. Pursuing a privately beneficial tactical purpose
A final question is whether corporate founders should be allowed
to form a corporation to pursue a private benefit where the strategic
purpose is to engage in a tactical purpose that provides first-order
benefits to stockholders or another constituency. In fact, analogs of
this form already exist. Housing cooperatives throughout the U.S. are
home to 1.2 million families. 375 The first-order benefits are entirely
stockholder-serving: to provide them with a place to live while
maximizing their comfort to the extent that the cooperative’s finances
allow. Other examples include incorporated family farms, 376 and
MasterCard, which until 2003 was a nonprofit membership
corporation purposed to process its 25,000 member institutions’

371. Dep’t. of Transp. v. Assoc. of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1232 (2015); Lebron, 513
U.S. at 380 n.1, 385. “In its first 43 years of operation, Amtrak has received more than $41
billion in federal subsidies. In recent years these subsidies have exceeded $1 billion annually.”
Assoc. of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. at 1232.
372. Id. at 1232–33.
373. Presumably on a smaller scale. See supra note 371.
374. The charter may include a provision allowing the board of directors to levy an
assessment on shareholders. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6) (Supp. 2015). Enforcing an
assessment would be prohibitively difficult in the case of a public corporation with diffuse
ownership, but possible in theory. A very high stock price, for example, is likely to concentrate
ownership in the hands of those who can afford an assessment. Cf. Berkshire Hathaway Shares
Top $200,000, Buffett Worth Nearly $66B, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2014, 1:22 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2014/08/14/berkshire-shares-top-200000buffett-worth-nearly-66b/.
375. NAT’L CONSUMER COOP. BANK, A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO BUYING A CO-OP
2 (2007).
376. See supra text accompanying notes 48–50. Some, like Ben & Jerry’s, consider the
support of family farming to be a public service. See supra text accompanying note 314.
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credit-card transactions. 377 Second-order positive externalities
generated by such firms can be substantial and are like those under the
shareholder value norm. 378
C. Accountability
Corporate law is about setting default rules that facilitate efficient
transacting and restraining the potential for opportunistic behavior,
such as shirking or rent seeking, by the board of directors. General
corporations with fully customizable tactical and strategic purposes
allow shareholders to create organizational architectures that best
balance managerial decision rights, their performance evaluation, and
their reward system. 379 Corporate founders possess knowledge of their
firms’ “particular circumstances of time and place” that makes them
the best judges of both how to create monetary or nonmonetary
benefits and how to align managerial incentives and protect
shareholders. 380
This section discusses two broad implications of this Article’s
proposal on organizational architecture. It first discusses how the
flexibility to customize corporate purpose alleviates the multiplemasters problem vis-à-vis benefit corporations (b-corps), the most
common corporate variant accommodating nonwealth ends, by
allowing shareholders to specify a finite set of measurable purposes.381
It then briefly addresses potential concerns with enforcing fiduciary
duties in the context of nonstandard purposes.

377. EDWARD P. STRINGHAM, ANARCHY AND THE LAW: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
CHOICE 304 (2011); Robert E. Litan & Alex J. Pollock, The Future of Charge Card Networks 6
(AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Reg. Studies, Working Paper 06-03, 2006).
378. See supra Sections I.B.2.b, III.B.1.
379. This Article thus adopts the conceptual framework of University of Rochester Simon
Business School professors James A. Brickley, Clifford W. Smith, and Jerrold L. Zimmermen.
See JAMES A. BRICKLEY ET AL., MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL
ARCHITECTURE viii–ix, 280–450 (3d ed. 2004). Their framework builds on Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 5, and other work.
380. Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. Sanders, Posner, Hayek and the Economic Analysis of
Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 559, 561–62, 568 (2008).
381. California’s Social Purpose Corporations Act comes closest to the system advocated
herein. It allows the formation of “social purpose corporation[s]” that must pursue shareholder
profit and either (1) promote one or more public benefit or (2) commit to minimizing its effect
on an intra- or extra-firm constituency. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b). The Act does not allow
the pursuit of a single purpose.
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1. Off-the-rack alternatives
The multiple-masters problem is summed up by Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel: “[A] manager told to serve two masters (a
little for the equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed
of both and is answerable to neither. Faced with a demand from either
group, the manager can appeal to the interests of the other.” 382 It is
said that “[C]orporate decision making is more efficient and effective
when management has a single, clearly-defined objective, and
shareholder wealth maximization provides not only a workable
decision guide but one that, if pursued, increases the total wealth
creation of the firm.” 383 Managers, however, are perfectly capable of
multitasking. 384 But balancing provides them cover to “serve” the
constituency with interests most aligned with their own; managers
have shown their willingness to “balance” in this way. 385
B-corps must serve multiple constituencies. Those formed under
the Model Benefit Corporation Act “shall have a purpose of creating
general public benefit” and “may [pursue] one or more specific public
benefits.” 386 The general public benefit is exceedingly broad, covering
“all of the effects of the business on society and the environment,”
and is “assessed against a third-party standard.” 387 Pursuing general
benefits is mandatory even if the charter specifies a specific public

382. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 38. Scholarship on the multiple-masters
topic is legion. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 280, at 150; Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001);
Bainbridge, SWM Norm, supra note 1 passim.
383. John R. Boatright, What’s Wrong—and What’s Right—with Stakeholder Management,
22 J. PRIVATE ENTER. 106, 119 (2006) (citation omitted).
384. See STOUT, supra note 1, at 108.
385. See, e.g., Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986)
(observing that the “principal benefit” of the Revlon board’s ostensibly serving Revlon’s
noteholders “went to the directors”); Bainbridge, SWM Norm, supra note 1, at 1445–46
(“Many of the same managers who vigorously lobbied state legislators in favor of nonshareholder
constituency statutes, were equally vigorous in opposing plant closing laws and other worker
protection statutes. Many of the same managers who bewailed the jobs lost after successful
corporate takeovers, were silent about the jobs lost because of management defensive tactics.
Ironically, much of the anecdotal evidence on the harm to nonshareholders caused by takeovers
relates to employees fired after defensive restructurings used by incumbent managers to defeat a
hostile bid.”); supra notes 351–355 and accompanying text.
386. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 201(a)–(b).
387. Id. § 102 & cmt.
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benefit. 388 Directors are explicitly required to consider the interests of
shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, its and its suppliers’
communities, and the local and global environments; they may
consider “the interests of any other group that they deem
appropriate.” 389 Delaware allows its b-corps to pursue specifically
enumerated public benefits only and makes assessment against a thirdparty standard optional, but it nonetheless mandates consideration of
“the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s
conduct.” 390
If enforcing managerial fidelity under the permissive BJR is
difficult, it is impossible when an act otherwise egregious enough to
warrant judicial scrutiny can be explained away by pointing to another
constituency, especially when managers are required to consider
constituencies with interests directly adverse to those of the firm.391
Such vastly expanded managerial cover may warrant more managerial
accountability than demanded by the BJR. Mandating adjudication of
the general benefit against a third-party standard may also transfer
significant de facto control over corporate affairs from managers to
third-parties. It displaces managers’ and founders’ specific knowledge
and “conceptions of the ‘good,’” with that of distant strangers.392
Ironically, the b-corp model may, by upsetting the delicate balance of
managerial authority and accountability, undermine both the striking
growth that the BJR enables and the corporation’s role as a laboratory
for socially beneficial endeavors. 393
The proposal herein would allow founders free reign to set
strategic purpose. Their choice would be free of third-party
interference and undiluted by a plethora of general public benefits that
their firms may be ill equipped to achieve. They could choose ends,
including private nonpecuniary benefits, against which firm

388. Id. §§ 201(c), 301 cmt.; see Callison, supra note 100, at 98.
389. Id. § 301(a)(1)–(2) (emphasis added).
390. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 362(a), 365(a), 366(c)(3) (Supp. 2014, 2015).
391. See supra notes 185, 389 and accompanying text; see also supra Section II.B.1.
392. Callison, supra note 100, at 98–104. The third parties may also be captured by
“fourth-party” interests or by a subset of the certified firms.
393. See supra text accompanying notes 110, 151–153.
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performance is readily measurable while avoiding those that
enable cheating. 394
2. Enforcing shareholder rights
The chief danger of freedom of corporate purpose is that a
shareholder vote in a wealth-maximizing firm will adopt a
nonstandard purpose, leaving dissenting shareholders with
significantly devalued post-vote shares. In corporations chartered
prior to the general acceptance of nonwealth strategic purposes, the
acceptance of such purposes should therefore be accompanied by very
strong appraisal rights or a near-unanimity requirement—a
shareholder vote of at least ninety or ninety-five percent—to adopt
nonstandard strategic purposes. 395 A lower threshold, like the twothirds accompanied by appraisal rights for dissenters required by
Delaware to convert a general corporation into a b-corp, should
suffice for firms formed after nonstandard purposes become
accepted. 396 At that point, founders would be aware of the need to
specify a higher threshold in the charter should they desire one. Lower
thresholds would enable stockholders with potential non–shareholder

394. Founders could, of course, purpose a firm with immeasurable ends. They are free to
take that risk, and future shareholders are free to buy into it. For more on b-corps’ inefficiencies,
see Murray, supra note 185; Callison, supra note 100.
A word on nonprofit corporations is also in order: As for-profit firms currently serve their
owners’ pecuniary interests, nonprofits serve nonpecuniary ones. Not allowing a customizable
middle ground is arbitrarily limiting. At a workshop of this paper, a participant who worked with
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) noted that since 2008 many NGOs have been
struggling financially and unable to make up their shortfalls by engaging in profit-making
activities. She noted that the availability of the framework proposed herein might have alleviated
this problem.
395. Appraisal rights are notoriously inadequate for compensating dissenting shareholders
who exercise them in various contexts. See, e.g., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
466 (1977) (shares appraised at $150 going concern value in a Delaware short-form merger
while the firm’s assets were worth $640 per share).
Delaware initially required 90-percent shareholder approval for a traditional corporation
to convert to a benefit corporation, but modified its statute to require only a two-thirds vote,
apparently finding that 90-percent was too high when publicly traded Etsy had trouble
converting.
Haskell
Murray,
Amendments
to
Delaware PBC Law (“The Etsy
Amendments”), BUS L. PROF BLOG (July 3, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
business_law/2015/07/amendments-to-delaware-pbc-law-the-etsy-amendments.html.
Delaware’s change illustrates the need for a high threshold—the losing one third
deserves protection.
396. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 363(a) (Supp. 2015).
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wealth ends, like pension funds or foundations, too easily to hijack a
successful wealth-creating company.
The instant proposal should otherwise have relatively little impact
on existing legal rules or their implementation. Ultimate decisionmaking authority would continue to default to a BJR-protected
board. 397 There seems little reason to abandon such a successful
governance arrangement, especially considering that firms with
nonwealth ends are more likely to be run by their founders or others
with a passion for the purpose.
Courts are experienced in applying legal concepts from one area
to another. Although it is by design rare for courts to second-guess
managers, 398 applying the BJR to ends other than shareholder wealth
maximization should be noncontroversial. Asking, for example,
whether a merger serves a firm’s community rather than its
shareholders is well within judges’ capabilities. Indeed, they do
essentially this when determining whether managers of nonprofits
have adhered to their duty of obedience to their organizations’
missions. 399 The primary danger is that some difficult-to-quantify
nonstandard purposes may obscure managers’ self-serving actions.
But knowing and willing shareholders should be allowed to risk their
capital in this way. 400 Shareholders will, of course, do well to plan ex
ante to maximize managerial fidelity, and to retain control of or avoid
undertakings where this is overly difficult.
CONCLUSION
The general business corporation is a multi-faceted, multi-purpose
entity. Its full potential can be realized by freeing it from its one-sizefits-all wealth-maximization application. Long-term shareholder
wealth maximization provides a great deal of social benefit; it is the
proper default corporate strategic purpose. Nonwealth strategic
purposes have similar potential.
Some owners may desire wealth, and purpose their corporations
with long-run financial gain. Others may believe that the best path to
397. See id. § 141(a).
398. See supra Section II.B.1–2. Professor Haskell Murray terms the application of
fiduciary-duty rules to nonstandard purposes the “purpose judgment rule.” Murray, supra note
185, at 41–42.
399. NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN F. CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING NONPROFIT AND
TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 3.03[C] (2d ed. 2012).
400. See supra note 394 and accompanying text; Murray, supra note 185, at 41–42.
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wealth is indirect, via service to others. Still others may have little
interest in making money and seek to enable some other mission with
the corporate form. The law should not impose either end upon a
stockholder who desires another. Informed shareholders should be
allowed to pursue all lawful strategic purposes with their firms.
It remains to be seen how many firms will be chartered with
nonstandard ends. The existence of firms like Craigslist, Ben & Jerry’s,
and Hobby Lobby, where stockholder unanimity enables the pursuit
of nonwealth ends, suggests that the number will be nontrivial. Nonwealth-seeking entrepreneurs would no longer have to choose
between a general corporation that must pursue wealth and a b-corp
with severely diluted managerial accountability. That is a choice
between relying on court or board fiat to pursue nonstandard ends,
and nothing.
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